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ABSTRACT
Over the period 1980 – 2015, foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI) has become
more significant in connecting East Asia and the global market. Meanwhile, income
inequality has been growing in this region. Although existing literature has achieved
noticeable progress in identifying the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows both
theoretically and empirically, evidence is still inconclusive. This dissertation contributes
to the scholarship by providing new time-series evidence from East Asia confirming the
inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows. But this dissertation makes another important
contribution by introducing FDI policies to the scholarship. By employing the nested
analysis approach, this dissertation sheds light on how FDI policy liberalization conditions
the distributional effect of FDI inflows. Time-series cross-section analyses indicate that
FDI inflows have deteriorated income inequality in East Asia, and this relationship is
conditional on FDI policy liberalization. Liberalized FDI policies intensify the inequalityinducing effect of FDI inflows.
Building on case studies on China and Korea, I demonstrate that the conditional effect
of liberalized FDI policies can be achieved via two channels: regional distribution and
sectoral distribution of FDI inflows. The Chinese case shows that an increasingly equal
regional distribution of FDI inflows due to policy liberalization leads to rising income
inequality. The Korean case indicates that when liberalized policies open more economic
sectors to foreign investors, FDI inflows become more skewed toward service sectors, also
resulting in growing income disparities. Thus, the positive relationship between FDI
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inflows and income inequality is not merely an economic phenomenon, but rather a joint
product of political and economic forces.
As FDI policy liberalization becomes a dominant policy paradigm, and FDI inflows
continue to be a significant way of economic integration between East Asia and the world,
income gaps are likely to further deteriorate in this region. How to make FDI inflows more
beneficial to society has become a pressing issue for the governments in this region.

Keywords: FDI Inflows, FDI Policy Liberalization, Income Inequality,
East Asia
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Chapter One

Introduction

Background and Research Questions
Since the 1980s, globalization has made nations more closely connected. As an increasingly
significant component of globalization (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007), FDI inflows have been grown
remarkably. This tendency is particularly influential in East Asian developing countries.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (hereafter UNCTAD)1,
only 7.16 percent of global FDI flew into East Asian developing countries in 1980, but the share
increased to 21.39 percent in 2015. Over the past four decades, East Asia has received an
increasing portion of global FDI inflows, even though noticeable declines occurred in the first few
years after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.
In the meantime, this region has witnessed an upward trend of within-country income
inequality sweeping across nations, based on findings from the World Inequality Report of 20182
and data from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (hereafter SWIID). Widening
income inequality has attracted considerable attention from both scholars and policymakers.
Scholars have distinguished two stages of income inequality, that is, market inequality and net
inequality. The main difference is that market inequality refers to the distribution of pre-tax and
pre-transfer incomes, while net inequality accounts for government taxes and transfers (Solt,
2020). Given that FDI inflows have more direct influence on market inequality, this dissertation
makes use of the market Gini index from the SWIID to indicate income inequality.

Author’s calculations based on FDI data from the UNCTAD. Data can be accessed at
https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740.
2 World Inequality Report Executive Summary 2018 can be accessed at
https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-summary-english.pdf
1
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Do FDI inflows affect income inequality in East Asia? The parallel tendencies of growing
FDI inflows and rising income inequality suggest a positive answer. Yet, evidence from this region
is still sparse. A considerable size of literature has examined the distributional effect of FDI inflows
in a broader scope, that is, developing countries in the world. Although there are still debates,
many recent studies found that FDI inflows lead to an escalation in income inequality. Three
mechanisms are proposed to link FDI inflows and rising income inequality: enterprise-based wage
premiums, skill-based wage premiums, and wage polarization between occupations within service
sectors3. This dissertation is to identify whether the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows is
also present in East Asia. In this part, I contribute to the ongoing scholarship by providing new
time-series evidence.
However, this dissertation moves beyond a simple confirmation of the relationship between
FDI inflows and income inequality in East Asia. Most previous studies on the distributional effect
of FDI inflows have been largely conducted through the lens of economics, leaving little room for
the influence of the government. In these studies, it appears that the distributional effect of FDI
inflows is a purely economic phenomenon. I contend this perspective by arguing that the
distributional effect of FDI inflows is not a purely economic phenomenon, but rather a joint
product of political and economic forces. More specifically, I propose that FDI policies are deeply
involved in the distributional process of FDI inflows. Inspired by previous studies, I propose a
synthesized theoretical framework linking FDI inflows, FDI policies, and income inequality. FDI
policies do not directly shape income distribution, but rather intensify or mitigate the inequalityinducing effect of FDI inflows by influencing regional and sectoral distribution of FDI inflows.

3

A detailed discussion of these three mechanisms are presented in Chapter Two.
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The second part of my analyses on East Asia is to demonstrate the impact of FDI policies on the
distributional effect of FDI inflows based on statistical and historical evidence from this region.
Therefore, this dissertation aims to answer the following questions: Do FDI inflows affect
income inequality in East Asia? Do FDI policies influence the distributional effect of FDI inflows?
If so, how? Both FDI inflows and FDI policies have been investigated separately in the literature
of globalization and neoliberalism. This dissertation aims to bridge these two scholarly lines and
provide a more comprehensive picture of how governments are involved in the distributional effect
of FDI inflows.

Research Design: Nested Analysis
To answer my research questions, I employ the nested analysis approach proposed by
Lieberman (2005). Nested analysis is a synthetic approach combining large-N analysis (hereafter
LNA) and small-N analysis (hereafter SNA). As the first step of nested analysis, LNA is used to
examine the applicability of theories and the corresponding hypotheses. Then, SNA is exercised
to verify and collaborate on the validity of the theories confirmed by LNA or develop new theories
when statistical evidence does not support theories proposed in LNA. This integrated approach of
LNA and SNA is expected to maximize their potentials of theory-development and to improve the
validity of causal inference, according to Lieberman.
Based on the framework of nested analysis, this dissertation consists of two parts: time-series
cross-sectional analysis (hereafter TSCS analysis) and case study. By serving the function of LNA,
TSCS analysis examines the relationship between FDI inflows and the involvement of FDI policies
in this relationship. Data analyzed in this part come from a variety of public data sources and
3

government bureaus of statistics. The dataset covers nine high and low middle-income
countries/territories in East Asia in 1980, as defined by the World Bank: Hong Kong, Indonesia,
the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea), Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand
(The World Bank, 1980). Although the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) was still a
low-income country in 1980, it is included in this dissertation because its connection with the
world via FDI and trade has expanded remarkably over the past few decades. China is often treated
as an outlier, which needs to be excluded from cross-national studies. I challenge this practice
based on my statistical analyses reported in Chapter Three. Although the Chinese case is found to
be influential in some cases, statistical results do not fundamentally change due to inclusion or
exclusion of it. The results of statistical analyses not only reveal that FDI inflows are harmful to
equal income distribution, but also indicate that the government is not absent in the relationship
between FDI inflows and income distribution. More specifically, it shows that FDI policy
liberalization exacerbates the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows.
To illustrate how FDI policy liberalization has affected first FDI inflows and then income
inequality, I conduct case studies on China and Korea. The analyses are reported in Chapter Four
and Chapter Five, respectively. These two nations are selected based on three reasons: how well
they fit statistical models, the variation in FDI policy liberalization, and data availability. First,
these two cases provide contextual knowledge to confirm the conditional effect of FDI policies.
Lieberman (2005) suggests that in this case, the selection of cases should be based on whether they
are well predicted by statistical models. After running TSCS models, residuals are imputed to show
how well each country fits the statistical models. In general, the Korean case performs better fitness
with relatively smaller residuals, while China has larger residuals. Although the Chinese case does
4

not meet this criterion suggested by Lieberman, I argue that if analysis on a case, which does not
well fit the regression line, still offers some support for a particular causal model or theory, the
validity of that model or theory may be fairly high. Thus, it is still meaning to select China. Second,
these two countries have witnessed the largest changes regarding FDI policies in East Asia, which
fit the second criterion set by Lieberman (2005). Rapid changes in FDI policies are reflected in the
de jure financial globalization index from the KOF dataset indicates. With FDI policies as a major
component4, this policy index in China has increased by 34.68 points between 1980 and 2015,
while the change in Korea is the second largest, although smaller, with a value of 25.20 points
over the same period. Such noticeable policy changes make them the candidates from which we
can draw lessons. Third, my choice of these two cases is also dictated by data constraints due to
the need of time-series analysis. Publicly accessible data about these two nations cover longer time
spans than those from other nations.
Case studies on China and Korea reveal that FDI policy liberalization leads to rising income
gaps via two channels: greater regional openness and sectoral openness toward service sectors.
The analyses on China emphasize the impact of a wider distribution of FDI inflows on income
inequality, while the Korean case provides more evidence highlighting the importance of sectoral
distribution of FDI inflows. How relevant are these findings to other countries? I argue that these
two channels are important in understanding the consequences of liberalized FDI policies in the
entire region of East Asia and more broadly other regions as well.
First, regional distribution of FDI inflows is not unique to China as one of the largest and the
most diverse countries in the world. As the case study of China shows, FDI policy liberalization
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I provide more details of this index in Chapter Three.
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in China resulted in greater regional openness to foreign investors and then more equal distribution
of FDI inflows across provinces. Although FDI policies in other countries may not open or close
certain regions to foreigners as China did before, regional distribution of FDI inflows is not
immune to government policies in East Asia. To reduce poverty and achieve ethnic equality, the
Malaysian government has tried to use FDI and other economic tools to narrow economic gaps
between more developed states and less developed states (Abdul Karim & Fleming, 2012; Hassan,
2004). In the Philippines, government investment in special economic zones, highways, and ports
is found to be influential in regional allocation of FDI. Government influence on regional
allocation of FDI is also found to be present in contexts outside East Asia. For example, Bobonis
and Shatz (2007) found that in the United States, unitary taxation and state foreign offices influence
the location of FDI across states, even though general investment incentives seem to be less
influential. It is also suggested that government spending, particularly those on education, health,
and infrastructure, could affect the location of foreign investment in the United States (Coughlin
et al., 1991; Kandogan, 2012), the United Kingdom (Fallon & Cook, 2010), Turkey (Deichmann
et al., 2003), and Spain (Villaverde & Maza, 2012).
Second, the trend of increasing FDI inflows to service sectors has been present in East Asia
and the developing and developed countries in other areas. According to a report published by the
UNCTAD in 20035, service sectors have surpassed manufacturing sectors in receiving inward FDI
in both developing and developed countries since the 1990s. In the early 2000s, service sectors
have received around 60 percent of the global FDI inflows, while the share of manufacturing
sectors declined from 40 percent in 1990s to 35 percent in 2003. My case study Korea confirms
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The report can be found at https://unctad.org/en/pages/PressReleaseArchive.aspx?ReferenceDocId=4238.
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this sectoral shift. In other East Asian economies examined in this dissertation, this tendency is
also present (Negara & Firdausy, 2011; Sussangkarn et al., 2011). The 2008 World Investment
Report 6 by the UNCTAD shows that the shares of service sectors in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam have been larger than the shares of manufacturing since the
early 2000s. According to the UNCTAD report published in 20037, one reason that contributed to
the growth of FDI in services was greater sectoral openness in all kinds of economies. Thus, with
an emphasis on sectoral distribution of FDI inflows, the findings from my case study of Korea are
of great relevance to other East Asian economies and more broadly other regions.

Arguments in Brief and Contributions
My analyses conclude that FDI inflows have become an influential driving force of rising
income gaps between 1980 and 2015 in East Asia. Statistical results indicate that FDI inflows
exacerbate income inequality both in the short and long terms. But this relationship is by no means
immune to the influence of FDI policies. FDI policies are found to be a contributor to rising income
inequality. When FDI policies become more liberal, the inequality-inducing effect of FDI becomes
more pronounced. I argue that this conditional effect of FDI policies is materialized through two
channels: regional distribution and sectoral distribution of FDI.
Case studies on China and Korea provide details linking FDI policy liberalization, FDI
inflows, and growing income gaps. My analyses demonstrate that China’s policy openness to FDI
has led to an increasingly equal regional distribution of foreign capital across provinces. Rising
significance of FDI inflows in the local economies intensifies the inequality-inducing effect of FDI

6
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The report can be found at https://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2008_en.pdf.
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inflows. As for the Korean case, sectoral distribution of FDI inflow is more influential. As policy
restrictions began to be eased in the early 1990s, service sectors became more accessible to foreign
investors. Since then, most FDI inflows have been received by service sectors. This trend
continued after the drastic policy liberalization following the 1997 Financial Crisis. This sectoral
shift of FDI inflow alters income distribution. As more FDI flows into service sectors, wage
differentials produced by FDI inflows become more influential, resulting in widening income gaps.
This dissertation makes three important contributions to the ongoing debates on the
distributional effect of FDI inflows. First, this dissertation provides new evidence, particularly
time-series evidence, to the literature on East Asia. Previous studies on East Asia fall short of
providing comprehensive empirical evidence on the relationship between FDI inflows and income
inequality. Income distribution in this region began to attract scholarly attention in the late 1970s.
Back then, scholars and practitioners were particularly interested in how Korea and Taiwan could
have achieved the so-called “growth with equity” (Fei et al., 1979; Ranis, 1978; Rao, 1978). A
smaller size of recent literature, which began to study East Asia as a whole, is weak in providing
empirical evidence showing how FDI inflows are associated with income inequality. In his paper,
Feng (2011) studied four East Asian cases including China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, but he only
proposed explanatory factors such as more equitable wages in large-scale manufacturing and
public education to explain the trends of income inequality in these four cases. Chi and Kwon
(2012) provided a broader review of existing theories on income inequality from political,
economic, and demographic perspectives, although there are only two cases, namely Korea and
Taiwan, in their study. However, for some reason, they tested the correlation between income
inequality and each explanatory variable derived from theories separately. It is difficult to assess
8

whether FDI has more explanatory power than other factors. One of the earliest studies on the
distributional effect of FDI inflows in less-developed countries by Tsai (1995) found that only the
region of East Asia appears to be harmed by FDI inflows during the 1970s. There were eight lessdeveloped countries covered in Tsai’s study: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. This dissertation expands this scholarship by
adding China to the sample and covering a much longer time span from 1980 to 2015. In particular,
I employ time-series techniques to gauge the short- and long-term effects of FDI on income
inequality. Time-series evidence from my analyses will help us obtain more comprehensive
understanding of the distributional effect of FDI inflows.
Second, this dissertation offers evidence showing how FDI policies are involved in the
relationship between FDI inflows and income distribution. A considerable size of literature has
discussed the relationship between FDI inflows and income inequality across nations. But the
influence of government is largely missing or implicitly examined. Even though the literature of
developmental state has documented that East Asian governments are influential in their economic
development and globalization (Amsden, 1992; Haggard, 1990; Rodan, 2016; Stubbs, 2009;
Wade, 2004; Woo-Cumings, 1999), studies on the distributional effect of FDI inflows in East Asia
still largely overlook the influence of government (An & Bosworth, 2013; Fields, 1994; Fields &
Yoo, 2000). This dissertation explicitly examines the influence of government via FDI policies. I
demonstrate how liberalization of FDI policies has first altered the extent to which East Asia is
integrated into the world economy and then shaped income distribution. I conclude that the
distributional effect of FDI inflows is not only determined by economic forces, but also shaped by
policies forces.
9

Third, this dissertation not only provides time-series evidence showing the relationship
between FDI policy liberalization and income inequality, but also explores how policy
liberalization shapes income distribution. A growing literature has focused on the statistical
assessment of the distributional effect of FDI policies under the name of neoliberalism and
economic freedom. My analyses follow this scholarly line and confirm the deleterious effect of
FDI policy liberalization. But this dissertation moves beyond just confirmation. How policy
liberalization shapes income distribution comprises an important part of this dissertation. Building
on existing findings on FDI inflows and income inequality, I argue that FDI policy liberalization
intensifies the inequality-inducing effect of FDI via regional distribution and sectoral distribution.
An equal regional distribution of FDI inflows reinforces enterprise-based and skill-based wage
premiums, and more FDI into service sectors amplifies wage polarization between occupations
within service sectors. With increasingly liberalized policies, these two mechanisms become more
pronounced, leading to growing income inequality. My analyses on these two mechanisms enrich
our understanding of how policy liberalization conditions the inequality-inducing effect of FDI
inflows.
The second and third contributions jointly offer a new theoretical way of understanding
globalization and neoliberalism. On the one hand, the scholarship on the distributional effect of
globalization has largely overlooked or implicitly examined the impacts of policy liberalization.
On the other hand, since the early twenty-first century, a growing literature has discovered the
adverse effects of neoliberal policies on income distribution (Alfredo Filho & Johnston, 2005;
Davis-Hamel, 2012; Huber & Solt, 2004; Johnston, 2005; Stiglitz, 2002). However, the
mechanisms between liberalized policies and income distribution are not yet fully unfolded. This
10

dissertation proposes a more comprehensive way by combining these two scholarly lines. In my
synthesized theoretical framework, I argue that policy liberalization does not directly shape income
distribution, but rather indirectly affects income distribution by influencing the distribution of FDI
inflows across geographies and sectors. The distributional outcomes of neoliberalism are a
combination of economic and policies forces. The inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows results
from three economic mechanisms: enterprise-based wage premiums, skill-based wage premiums,
and wage polarization between occupations within service sectors. These mechanisms become
more pronounced when policy liberalization creates greater regional openness and a sectoral shift
favoring service sectors. By investigating income inequality through the lens of economic forces
and policy forces, this dissertation provides a more comprehensive theoretical approach for future
studies on globalization and neoliberalism.

The Organization of This Dissertation
This dissertation is arranged as follows. In Chapter Two, I first review the research on FDI
inflows and income inequality. A considerable size of literature has examined how FDI inflows
contribute to income inequality, but empirical evidence is still inconclusive. This dissertation
provides new time-series evidence from East Asia, confirming the inequality-inducing effect of
FDI inflows. Moreover, I argue that the relationship between FDI inflows and income inequality
is not immune to the influence of the government. Inspired by previous studies, I propose that FDI
policy liberalization conditions the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows. A synthesized
theoretical framework is proposed to bring FDI policy liberalization to the ongoing debates on FDI
inflows and income inequality.
11

To estimate the relationship between FDI inflows and income inequality and the conditional
effect of FDI policy liberalization, I employ TSCS estimators, specifically error correction models
(hereafter ECMs), to analyze data collected from various public sources and government statistics
bureaus. Results are presented in Chapter Three. Results show that FDI inflows have contributed
to growing income inequality over the period 1980 – 2015. But this relationship between FDI and
income inequality is not purely economic. I find that FDI policy liberalization also contributes to
rising income inequality in East Asia. More specifically, more liberal FDI policies intensify the
inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows.
To demonstrate how FDI policies, particularly liberal measures, have altered the allocation of
FDI and then led to rising income gaps, I conduct case studies on China and Korea. Analyses are
presented in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, respectively. A historical review of FDI policies in
both countries shows how policy liberalization has created opportunities for FDI inflows to spread
across geographies and economic sectors. Time-series analyses on these two nations further
provide evidence showing regional and sectoral distribution of FDI matters for income
distribution. An equal regional distribution of FDI inflows and FDI inflows to services are
detrimental to equal income distribution. When combining the results of policy reviews and timeseries analyses, I conclude the FDI policy liberalization indirectly affects income inequality by
shaping regional and sectoral distribution of FDI. Although policy liberalization may not directly
cause an escalation in income inequality, it intensifies the inequality-inducing effect of FDI.
Lastly, in the concluding chapter, namely Chapter Six, I first provide a summary of the
findings from statistical analyses and case studies and explain how these findings contribute to the
literature. I also discuss two limitations of this dissertation regarding the measurement of FDI
12

policies and case studies on China and Korea. Theoretical and practical implications are drawn to
conclude this dissertation.

13

Chapter Two

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

As an increasingly significant component of globalization, FDI refers to the investment that
allows foreigners to control assets in the host country (Huang, 2003). The influence of FDI inflows
on income inequality in the developing world has been widely studied (e.g. Alderson & Nielsen,
2002; Beer & Boswell, 2002; Evans & Timberlake, 1980; Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007; Mahutga &
Bandelj, 2008; Tsai, 1995). Early studies propose that FDI inflows create economic opportunities
and increase returns to labor based on traditional trade theories (Leamer & Levinsohn, 1997;
Stolper & Samuelson, 1941), resulting in narrower income gaps between the haves and the havenots. In contrast, most recent studies have found evidence that FDI perpetuates, rather than
mitigates, income inequality. The details of these two strands of literature are presented in the first
section of this chapter. The ambiguity of the relationship between FDI inflows and income
inequality requires empirical evidence. This dissertation provides new time-series evidence from
East Asia to this ongoing scholarship.
But this dissertation moves beyond just providing new evidence of the relationship between
FDI inflows and income inequality. This dissertation also aims to bring FDI policies to the
scholarship. Existing literature has achieved significant progress on developing theoretical
arguments and collecting empirical evidence regarding the distributional effect of FDI inflows.
However, the influence of government is largely implicitly examined, if not overlooked, in
previous studies. To fill this gap, my analyses add FDI policy liberalization to the fast-growing
literature. A detailed summary is provided in the second section.
In the third section, I develop a synthesized theoretical framework incorporating FDI policies
and FDI inflows. I argue that FDI policy liberalization conditions the distributional effect of FDI
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inflows. Liberalized FDI policies affect how FDI inflows are allocated across geographies and
sectors in receiving countries. Improvements in regional openness and sectoral openness to FDI
are hypothesized to amplify the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows, leading to rising income
inequality. The relationship between FDI inflows and income inequality is a joint product of
economic and policy forces.
I close this chapter with a review of alternative theories on income inequality, which will be
controlled in statistical analyses reported in Chapter Three. These theories explaining income
inequality have been proposed from political, economic, and sociodemographic perspectives.
Potentially influential factors that need to be controlled include regime institutions, government
education spending, international trade, economic development, unemployment rate, the elderly
population, and education attainment.

FDI Inflows and Income Inequality: Theories and Empirical Evidence
The distributional effect of FDI inflows in the developing world has been under heated debates
(e.g. Beer & Boswell, 2002; Bornschier & Ballmer-Cao, 1979; Bornschier et al., 1978; Mahutga
& Bandelj, 2008). One strand of the literature states that FDI inflows equalize income distribution
due to growing economic opportunities for workers, diminishing returns to capital, and increasing
returns to workers. In contrast, another strand of literature points out the adverse effect of FDI
inflows. Rather than being an income equalizer, foreign capital exacerbates income inequality via
several mechanisms, which are explained in detail below. The complex relationship between FDI
and income inequality makes empirical studies in great need. Yet, a consensus has not been
reached.
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On the one hand, for scholars who emphasize the inequality-reducing power of FDI inflows,
they argue that foreign investment equalizes income distribution by providing economic
opportunities for unskilled workers or for those who would not otherwise have them (Jensen &
Rosas, 2007; Obstfeld, 1998; Stern & Baru, 1994). This argument aligns with traditional trade
theories based on the Stolper–Samuelson theorem in the Heckscher–Ohlin model (Leamer &
Levinsohn, 1997; Stolper & Samuelson, 1941). When FDI inflows concentrate in labor-intensive
sectors in countries with abundant unskilled or low-skilled workers, they raise the relative demand
for these workers and hence drives up wages for them, resulting in narrower wage gaps between
skilled and unskilled/low-skilled workers. By investigating the subnational units of Mexico
between 1990 and 2000, Jensen and Rosas (2007) found increasing FDI inflows are associated
with decreases in income inequality. Both diminishing returns to capital and rising returns to labor
contribute to the convergence of the incomes of workers and capital holders. This theoretical
prediction, however, is found to be inapplicable to East Asia. By examining five East Asian
countries/political entities including Korea, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
over the period 1985 – 1998, Te Velde and Morrissey (2004) did not obtain evidence supporting
the inequality-reducing effect of FDI inflows. In addition, they found FDI inflows have intensified
income inequality in Thailand, after controlling domestic factors including wage setting and supply
of skills.
One the other hand, there is a growing size of literature concluding that FDI inflows perpetuate
income inequality in the developing countries. Three mechanisms are proposed to link FDI inflows
and income inequality. First, FDI inflows create income differentials between foreign-invested
enterprises (hereafter FIEs) and domestic (or indigenous) enterprises. Due to the advantages of
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abundant capital, advanced technology, and higher productivity, FIEs can generate more profits
and pay higher salaries to their employees, especially skilled workers, compared to their domestic
counterparts. Three other reasons are also proposed to explain why FIEs pay higher wages: higher
cost for labor due to government restrictions or the segmented labor market, internal fairness
policies to reduce income disparities between FIEs and branches in other nations, reducing labor
turnover and then preventing intangible and firm-specific assets like managerial skills from
leakage (Chen et al., 2011). Empirically, the existence of a foreign wage premium is fairly
consistent in existing literature in developing and developed countries (Aitken et al., 1996; Beer
& Boswell, 2002; Chen et al., 2011; Feliciano & Lipsey, 2006; Girma et al., 2001; Lipsey &
Sjöholm, 2004; Moran, 1998, 2002). For example, Chen et al. (2005) found FIEs in China offer
much higher wages than domestic enterprises based on the analyses on a Chinese household survey
conducted in 1995. It may be questioned that whether higher wages offered by FIEs are attributed
to industries and urban areas where FIEs are located. But even after controlling these industrial
and location characteristics, a foreign wage premium is still present and significant as reported in
existing studies (Te Velde, 2003).
Second, skill biases of international capital have appeared in many works on FDI inflows and
income inequality. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) noticed that the rising demand for skilled workers
is broadly associated with increasing flows of international capital. Studies on Latin America and
East Asia also document rising demands for skilled workers due to growing FDI inflows (Feenstra
& Hanson, 1997; Te Velde & Morrissey, 2004; Te Velde, 2003). Rising demand for skilled
workers first drives up wages for this group of workers and then increases income gaps between
them and their unskilled peers. For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) showed that growth in
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FDI inflows significantly contributed to larger wage shares of skilled labor by increasing the
demand for skilled labor during the 1980s in Mexico.
Third, a small group of literature argues that FDI generates larger income gaps through service
sectors. This mechanism relies on the heterogeneity of service sectors. Evans and Timberlake
(1980) pointed out that service sectors cover a wide range of occupations from rich doctors and
lawyers to poor domestic servants. Bogliaccini and Egan (2017) further developed this reasoning
by distinguishing services sectors with high and low skill requirements. When FDI flows into
service sectors that require high skills, the need for skilled labor drives up wage premiums for
skilled labor. When FDI enters service sectors with low skill requirements, foreign investors may
reform the previous labor contracts by forcing former employees into informal employment.
Combining the effects of FDI on these two types of service sectors, expansion in service sectors is
accompanied with a more polarized structure of occupations and associated wages. Thus,
increasing FDI inflows into services are likely to result in rising income gaps. Based on the
analyses on 60 middle-income countries over the period 1989 – 2000, Bogliaccini and Egan (2017)
concluded that FDI inflows in services, compare than FDI inflows in other sectors, are more likely
to exacerbate income disparities.
Although the aforementioned three mechanisms are not always directly tested, empirical
evidence confirming that FDI inflows deteriorate income inequality has been discovered widely
(e.g. Alderson & Nielsen, 1999; Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Beer & Boswell, 2002; Choi, 2006;
Dixon & Boswell, 1996; Evans & Timberlake, 1980; Figini & Görg, 2011; Mahutga & Bandelj,
2008; Reuveny & Li, 2003; Taylor & Driffield, 2005; Tsai, 1995). For instance, Mahutga and
Bandelj (2008) documented drastic increases in FDI inflows in Central and Eastern Europe and
18

found that these changes imposed a robust and positive effect on income inequality. Beer and
Boswell (2002) employed a panel analysis of 65 nations during the period from the 1980s to the
early 1990s. Their analyses show that foreign investment largely benefits the top 20 percent of the
income-earning population over the poorer 80 percent. Basu and Guariglia (2007) also documented
the differences in benefits generated by FDI inflows along the rich-poor line in their panel study
of 119 developing countries.

Situating FDI Policies in Existing Debates
As I discussed above, the distributional effect of FDI inflows is a complex issue. Theoretical
discussion and empirical analyses have received growing scholarly attention. Yet, existing studies
have largely overlooked the role of government in shaping the distributional effect of FDI inflows.
Although FDI is often treated as an economic phenomenon, governments are not absent from this
process of economic integration. Some studies have investigated how governments are involved
in attracting foreign capital. For example, policies, such as tax concessions, guarantees of profit
repatriation, and easier procedures of laying off employees, are implemented to favor foreign
capital (London & Robinson, 1989; O'Hearn, 1989).
A close examination of East Asia reveals how governments have utilized policy tools to
promote FDI. For example, between the 1960s and 1970s, FDI into Korea was heavily restricted
by the government due to top political leaders’ concern of foreign control (Nicolas et al., 2013).
Since the early 1990s, the Korean government began to proactively relax the previous restrictive
FDI policies. China has also been proactive in attracting foreign investment by using various
policies tools including removing restrictions, providing tax incentives, and streamlining approval
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procedures (Fetscherin et al., 2010; Huang, 2003; Ng, 2013). In addition, ever since its
independence, FDI has been a vital tool for the Malaysian government to develop its economy
(Athukorala & Wagle, 2011). Since the late 1960s, the government policy agenda has placed great
emphasis on attracting FDI inflows and allocating foreign capital to promote export-oriented
manufacturing sectors. FDI has been part of the Malaysian national economic development plans
with the goals of economic development and ethnic equality (Athukorala & Menon, 1996; Gomez
& Saravanamuttu, 2013; Mohamad, 2005). Thus, FDI inflows not only indicate to what extent East
Asia has been integrated into the global market, but also imply government influence in shaping
globalization.
Inspired by the histories of economic development from countries in East Asia, this
dissertation brings public policies, specifically FDI policies, to the scholarship. Studies on the
distributional effect of FDI policies are often conducted under the name of neoliberalism.
Neoliberalism, a broad and debate-provoking concept, is described as a political project that
prioritizes a market-oriented economic system against state intervention in the market or any types
of collective-oriented system including Keynesianism, welfare states, and planned economy
(Tickell & Peck, 2003; Venugopal, 2015). Thatcherism and Reaganism are two widely known
forms of neoliberalism found in the United Kingdom and in the United States. As many policy
issues have been placed on the agenda by the advocates of neoliberalism1, I primarily focus on
liberalization of FDI policies.

According to Peck and Tickell (2002, 167-8), these policy issues include: trade liberalization, financial liberalization,
privatization of production, deregulation, foreign capital liberalization (eliminating barriers to foreign direct investment),
secure property rights, unified and competitive exchange rates, diminished public spending (fiscal discipline), public
expenditure switching (to health, schooling, and infrastructure), tax reform (broadening the tax base, cutting marginal
tax rates, less progressive tax), a social safety net (narrowly targeted, selective transfers for the needy), and flexible
labor markets.
1
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Empirical examination of FDI policies and income inequality in a cross-national context has
largely appeared in recent studies. Most of them have been conducted under the title of economic
freedom, which consists of FDI policy liberalization, trade liberalization, and other marketoriented policy reforms. Although liberalization of FDI policies is not explicitly investigated in
these studies, their findings may be applicable to FDI policies as their measures of economic
freedom always comprise FDI policies. Similar to studies on FDI inflows, a consensus has not
been reached regarding the relationship between FDI policy liberalization and income inequality.
On the one hand, FDI policy liberalization is found to be associated with severer income
inequality. By comparing the levels of income inequality and changes in Gini index between 1982
and 1995, Huber and Solt (2004) pointed out the inequality-inducing effect of neoliberalism in
Latin America. They found that higher levels of policy liberalization are associated with higher
levels of income inequality and poverty, and more radical liberalization reforms are associated
with rapid escalation in income inequality. By conducting a case study on Chile, Davis-Hamel
(2012) demonstrated how policy reforms based on the orthodox neoliberalism had amplified
income inequality from 1973 to 1990. Statistical analyses with broader regional coverage also
confirm the inequality-inducing effect of FDI policy liberalization. By using the Economic
Freedom Index (hereafter EFI) 2 covering 66 countries over the period 1975 – 1985, Berggren
(1999) found that higher levels of economic freedom, particularly financial deregulation and trade
liberalization, are associated with severer income inequality. A recent study by Bergh and Nilsson
(2010) confirmed this positive relationship with more extensive coverage of high- and middle-

2

The EFI data are accessible at https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/economic-freedomf.
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income countries over the period 1970 – 2005. But they also note that the finding may result from
a large share of developed countries in their sample.
Policy liberalization is not always found to be detrimental to equal income distribution. By
employing a fixed-effects estimator in their analyses of 108 countries over the period 1971 – 2010,
Sturm and De Haan (2015) found policy liberalization, measured by the EFI, exerts no impacts on
income distribution. In addition, a non-linear relationship between economic freedom and income
inequality is also proposed in studies. In their study of 138 countries between the 1960s and the
2010s, Apergis and Cooray (2017) proposed an inverted-U shape relationship, in which income
inequality first increases and then declines after economic freedom passes a threshold of around
5.4 on a 0–10 scale.

A Synthesized Theoretical Framework
Inspired by the extensive literature on the distributional effect of FDI inflows and the growing
literature on FDI policy liberalization, I propose a synthesized theoretical framework that
combines FDI inflows and FDI policies. I argue that FDI policies do not directly alter income
distribution, but rather condition the relationship between FDI inflows and income inequality in
East Asia. Not only do FDI policies shape how much foreign investment is allowed to enter
receiving countries, but they also influence how FDI inflows are allocated across geographies and
sectors. Liberalization of FDI policies results in greater regional and sectoral openness, which
intensify the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows.
On the one hand, with more regions open to foreign investors, FDI inflows become widely
distributed across the host nation and then become a significant part of local economies with the
nation. Due to enterprise-based and skill-based wage premiums, an increasing presence of FDI
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inflows across exacerbates income inequality. Thus, FDI policy liberalization intensifies the
inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows via an equal regional distribution of foreign capital.
Studies on China have long advocated for a more open investment environment to reduce regional
inequality, which is defined as differences in economic development between provinces. This
policy suggestion is based on the finding that the uneven distribution of foreign capital across
provinces increases regional inequality (Frank, 1967; Stack, 1980; Zhang & Zhang, 2003). My
analyses offer a different perspective. An equal regional distribution of FDI inflows due to more
open policies exacerbates, rather than mitigates, income inequality. Although my argument is not
incompatible with existing studies on regional inequality in China, it suggests that unfavorable
distributional outcomes may occur due to increasingly liberalized policies.
On the other hand, with more economic sectors becoming accessible to foreign investors,
service sectors become more popular than manufacturing industries by receiving large shares of
FDI inflows. Due to the diversity within service sectors, rising FDI inflows drive up wages for
skilled labor and decrease wage for unskilled labor, leading to a polarized wage structure within
service sectors (Bogliaccini & Egan, 2017; Evans & Timberlake, 1980). With rising inflows of
foreign capital into service sectors, wage differentials between service occupations become more
pronounced, contributing to the overall income inequality.
In sum, the synthesized theoretical framework I propose bridges the two scholarly lines on the
distributional effect of FDI inflows and FDI policies. I argue that there is a need to connect FDI
policies with the mechanisms through which FDI increases income inequality. Prior studies have
provided empirical support for the relationship between FDI policy liberalization and rising
income inequality. But they do not explain how these two are connected. I suggest that FDI policy
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liberalization amplifies the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows through regional distribution
and sectoral distribution of FDI inflows. When the significance of foreign capital increases across
geographies and economic sectors in host economies, the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows
through enterprise-based wage premiums, skill-based wage premiums, and polarized wage
structure within service sectors becomes more influential, resulting in rising income disparities.

Controlling Alternative Theories on Income Inequality
In Chapter Three, by using TSCS analysis, I examine how FDI inflows affect income
distribution and how FDI policies are involved in this relationship. Scholars have achieved
significantly advance in explaining income inequality. Explanations have been offered from
political, economic, and sociodemographic perspectives. In this section, I provide a review of these
alternative theories, which will be controlled in statistical analyses presented in the next chapter.
Theories I review in this section are related to regime institutions, government education spending,
international trade, economic development, unemployment rate, the elderly population, and
education attainment.

1) Regime Institutions and Government Education Spending
Regime institutions have long remained at the center of the scholarship on income inequality,
particularly in cross-national studies (For an overview of regime types and income inequality,
check Acemoglu et al., 2015). Democratic regimes are conceived to be associated with lower
income inequality from two perspectives. On the one hand, political elites seek political powers
by gaining a wide range of support from ordinary citizens. To achieve that, elites need to use
various ways, including policy decisions, to satisfy voters’ need to then gain loyalty from them.
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This mechanism is more likely to appear when the emergence of democratization is primarily
attributed to (re)distributional issues (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2005; Boix, 2003;
Meltzer & Richard, 1981). On the other hand, democratic institutions empower average citizens
via political parties, elections, and social mobilization (Gradstein & Milanovic, 2004; Lee, 2005;
Lenski, 2013; Muller, 1988; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Simpson, 1990). Based on these two
perspectives, democracy is believed to equalize income distribution, especially when a country has
a longer history of democratic experience (Muller, 1988).
In contrast to democracies, authoritarianism is conceived to be a type of regime that favors
elites with unequal distribution of economic resources, benefits the powerful rich minority, and
allocates fewer resources on the rest of society (Brown & Hunter, 1999). The aforementioned
studies on democratic regimes largely confirm this expectation as they examine democratic
regimes against authoritarian regimes. There is evidence, however, showing authoritarian regimes
pursue relatively equal redistribution under certain circumstances. For example, Albertus (2015)
challenged the conventional wisdom that democracy is more efficient on land redistribution. Based
on the cross-national analyses on the agrarian reforms in Latin America, Albertus demonstrated
that successful implementation of land reform necessitates the concentration of power, which is
most often found under authoritarianism. Due to the effectiveness of enacting land reforms,
inequality reduction becomes more plausible in authoritarian regimes. Albertus’s work reminds us
that the heterogeneity of authoritarianism deserves more careful consideration. It has been
demonstrated that right authoritarianism would be associated with narrower income disparities
(Huber et al., 2006; Schamis, 1991).
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Although it is possible that certain authoritarian regimes could improve income distribution, I
hypothesize that democratic institutions are more likely to impose pro-poor policies that mitigate
the adverse effects of FDI such as income inequality (Dreher et al., 2008; Garrett, 2000; Kaufman
& Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Lee, 2005; Menendez, 2016). On the one hand, government policies,
such as public investment in education and health (Barros et al., 2010; Esquivel et al., 2010;
Kahhat, 2010; Morgan & Kelly, 2013) and improvements in basic infrastructure (Calderón &
Chong, 2004; Trotter, 2016), directly affect the distribution of market incomes. On the other hand,
redistributive policies, such as taxes and transfers, potentially affect income inequality in the long
run as well. Not only does government redistribution provides immediate benefits to individuals
and then equalizes the distribution of disposable incomes, but it only has implications on the
distribution of market incomes over time. By influencing earning capacities of individuals and
households, redistribution can also affect the future distribution of market incomes, which is called
the second-round effects of redistributive policies (Anderson et al., 2017; Chu et al., 2000;
Gregorio & Lee, 2002).
It is often argued that government spending on education reduces income inequality due to the
accumulation of human capital. By receiving more education, individuals, especially the poor,
improve their earning ability, which in result narrows income gaps. Under the circumstances of
economic growth, government investment in education results in an equal distribution of the
economic pie to society (Rudra, 2004). In their study on Latin America and the Caribbean, Morgan
and Kelly (2013) showed that when government spending on education and health care reaches a
relatively high level, economic growth leads to more egalitarian income distribution. The logic of
the conditional effect of education spending on economic growth is also applicable to the
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relationship between FDI and income inequality. As I discussed above, one mechanism, by which
FDI intensifies income disparities, relates to rising demand for skilled labor due to increasing
inflows of FDI. When the supply of skilled workers does not match the demand, wages for skilled
labor rises, resulting in wider income gaps between groups with different skill levels. To increase
the supply of skilled workers, government investment in education plays a vital role. Asian
countries have long acknowledged the importance of education in economic development and have
been significant in education provision (ADB, 2009; Haggard, 1990). It has been documented that
East Asian governments have delivered more efforts on providing education, particularly primary
and secondary education (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Lee & Francisco, 2012).
However, a growing literature, particularly those from economics, has provided evidence
showing the adverse effects of education (Abdullah et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2017). There is
evidence showing that the urban middle-income groups in developing countries benefit most from
government investment in education (Davoodi et al., 2003; Tanzi, 1974). This could happen in the
expansion of both secondary and tertiary education. As for secondary education, children from
disadvantaged backgrounds may still be in short of insufficient resources for the school or fall
behind their peers due to weaker intellectual support from their parents. Furthermore, expansion
in higher education seems to be disproportionately beneficial to high-income families (Blanden &
Machin, 2004; Jimenez, 1986). Similar concerns appear in East Asia as well. Byun and Kim (2010)
argued that government policies related to school choice and tracking in Korea contribute to higher
education inequality, which in turn leads to widening income gaps. The expansion of higher
education in China since 2000 has generated greater income gaps because of higher returns to
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college graduates and rising spending differences between elite and mass universities (Carnoy,
2011).

2) Economic and Sociodemographic Explanations
Since the 1970s, trade liberalization has become a sweeping force in many developing
countries (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007). With the removal of trade barriers, these countries are
increasingly exposed to international markets. The distributional effects of international trade have
been widely investigated by scholars, yet theories and empirical evidence are still ambiguous.
There is little consensus on the relationship between international trade and income inequality.
On the one hand, international trade is argued to raise the returns to abundant factors of
production according to the Stolper–Samuelson theorem in the Heckscher–Ohlin model (Leamer
& Levinsohn, 1997; Stolper & Samuelson, 1941). This theorem suggests that in developing
countries where labor, particularly unskilled labor, is relatively abundant, trade openness is
expected to increase the return to labor, resulting in more equal income distribution. In contrast,
in developed countries, where capital is the relatively abundant factor of production, trade
liberalization is expected to bring higher returns to capital, leading to deterioration in income
inequality. Thus, international trade is believed to have the ability to narrow income gaps (Adams,
2004; Beer & Boswell, 2002; Jensen & Rosas, 2007; Prechel, 1985; Reuveny & Li, 2003; Stack,
1980; Stolper & Samuelson, 1941; Tsai & Huang, 2007). This theory seems applicable to the early
history of East Asia, thanks to abundant low-skilled labor in the 1970s and 1980s (Koo, 1984; Te
Velde & Morrissey, 2004; Wood, 1995, 1997).
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On the other hand, scholars have argued that international trade largely benefits skilled
workers, instead of unskilled workers. Thanks to technological diffusion from developed countries
to developing countries, rising demand for skilled labor increase wages premium between skilledworkers and unskilled-workers (Lee & Vivarelli, 2004; Meschi & Vivarelli, 2009). Instead of
reducing income gaps, trade further penetrates income discrepancy between these groups of
workers (Atkinson, 2001; Feenstra & Hanson, 2003; Forbes, 2000; Jensen & Rosas, 2007; Stiglitz,
1998). Another mechanism, through which trade increases income inequality, is that tradeparticipating firms offer a wage premium compared to non-participants (Egger & Kreickemeier,
2009; Helpman et al., 2017; Helpman et al., 2010).
Studies on economic growth have provided contradictory findings as well. After Kuznets’s
pioneering work on the inverted-U shape relationship between economic growth and income
inequality (Kuznets, 1955), there have been numerous studies on this front (e.g. Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2002; Fields, 1994; Gallup, 2012; Glaeser, 2008; Nielsen & Alderson, 1995). Studies
on East Asia, however, have cast doubt on the applicability of the Kuznets Curve in this region. In
particular, Korea and Taiwan are often treated as counter-examples or outliers against what
Kuznets proposed (An, 2003; Chi & Kwon, 2012; Ranis, 1978).
Unemployment rate is commonly found to be positively associated with income inequality by
previous studies (Bradley et al., 2003; Moller et al., 2003). The elderly population refers to
individuals at age 65 or above. Without a job and incomes, a large share of the aging population
is likely to raise income gaps (An & Bosworth, 2013; Dong et al., 2018; Lin et al., 2015; Ohtake
& Saito, 1998). Education tends to be an income equalizer because higher educational achievement
generally raises earning ability and thus leads to higher incomes (Coady & Dizioli, 2018; Gregorio
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& Lee, 2002). This is particularly relevant in East Asia as studies have stressed the significant role
of education in economic development of this region (Bloom et al., 2000; Collins et al., 1996;
Mingat, 1998; Permani, 2009). However, recent studies have expressed concerns that higher
education in East Asia may generate higher, not lower, inequality due to unequal access to colleges
and intensified job competition (Mok, 2016; Yeung, 2013).
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Chapter Three

TSCS Analysis

In this chapter, I explore whether FDI inflows affect income inequality in East Asia and the
conditional effect of FDI policies on this relationship over the period 1980 – 2015 by using TSCS
analysis. As I discussed in Chapter Two, I hypothesize that FDI inflows worsen income inequality
in East Asia. The results of TSCS analyses confirm my hypothesis. FDI inflows exacerbate income
inequality both in the short- and long terms. This relationship between FDI and income inequality
seems to be conditional on FDI policy liberalization. Statistical results, although not statistically
significant, show that FDI policy liberalization intensifies the inequality-inducing effect of FDI
inflows. When policy liberalization is conducted rapidly, increases in FDI inflows will generate
stronger negative influence on income distribution, resulting in severer income gaps. To
understand how FDI policy liberalization and FDI inflows are associated with rising income
inequality, I turn to case studies on China and Korea in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.
This chapter is arranged as follows. The first section provides details on data sources,
measures, hypotheses, and estimation method. Robustness checks without potentially influential
cases are also conducted to identify the consistency of the results. In the second section, statistical
results from error correction models are reported to demonstrate the distributional effect of FDI.
The third section presents statistical results showing the conditional effect of FDI policies are also
presented in this section. I close this chapter with a discussion of the move to case studies.

Data and Hypotheses
Data analyzed in this chapter are compiled from various open data sources, including the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (hereafter IMF), the United Nations, and
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government bureaus of statistics. The details of these data sources are presented in Appendix 1.
My dataset covers nine countries and territories with a total of 324 country-years. Income
inequality is measured by the market Gini index from the SWIID Version 8.3. This index measures
the distribution of market income or the so-called “pretax, pre-transfer income”, which refers to
the amount of money earned by households excluding government cash or in-kind benefits (Solt,
2020).
Market Gini ranges from 0 to 100, with higher numbers indicating larger income gaps. The
SWIID incorporates and standardizes observations collected from major cross-national datasets1
and domestic sources from individual countries to create comparable data across countries. To
reduce the uncertainty of income data due to conceptual and practical difficulties in data collection,
multiple-imputation techniques are used to obtain the final measure of inequality. As a result, the
SWIID provides inequality data with more extensive coverage and greater comparability than any
other existing datasets, such as the All the Ginis dataset from the World Bank and Gini index from
the World Inequality Database (WID).
FDI inflows are operationalized as annual FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP. Data come
from the UNCTAD. With more recent scholarly works suggesting a positive relationship between
FDI and income inequality since the 1980s, I hypothesize that FDI inflows increase income
inequality in East Asia over the past four decades. According to the literature, the inequalityinducing effect of FDI is realized via three mechanisms: enterprise-based wage premiums, skillbased wage premiums, and wage polarization between occupations within service sectors.

1

Including the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the UNU-WIDER databases.

32

To indicate the liberalization of FDI policies, I make use of the de jure financial globalization
index2 from the KOF globalization index dataset (Dreher, 2006; Gygli et al., 2019). This index
encompasses three components of investment restrictions, capital account openness, and
international investment agreements 3 . By definition, FDI policies are not the only policy area
quantified in this index, which may raise concerns about whether this index can serve as an
appropriate indicator of FDI policies. In other words, it is hard to identify the influence of FDI
policies given the broad definition of the de jure financial globalization index. I use two ways to
mitigate the gap between FDI policy liberalization and the de jure financial globalization index.
This first way I use is to focus on the interaction term between the de jure financial globalization
index and FDI inflows. When the interaction is found to be influential, policies that are involved
should be mainly related to FDI. In a sense, I use the interaction to single out FDI policies from
other financial policies measured in the de jure financial globalization index. In the meanwhile,
the influence of other financial policies should be reflected in the coefficient for the de jure
financial globalization index, not the coefficient for the interaction term. Of course, the use of
interaction term between FDI policies and FDI inflows is not just to solve this conceptual and
measurement issue, but also to test the hypothesis I propose in Chapter Two that FDI policies
condition the distributional effect of FDI inflows.
The second way is to employ a correlation test to gauge between the de jure financial
globalization index and the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index published by the OECD. The

This index is named KOFFiGIdj in the KOF Globalization Index dataset.
According to the KOF, these three components are defined as follows. Investment restrictions refer to prevalence of
foreign ownership and regulations to international capital flows. Capital account openness is based on Chinn-Ito index
of capital account openness. International investment measures Number of Bilateral Investment Agreements (BITs)
and Treaties with Investment Provisions. They contribute to the de jure financial globalization with weights of 32.2, 38.7,
and 29.1 respectively.
2
3
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OECD index is strictly defined to measure the restrictiveness of a country’s FDI rules by
examining four main types of restrictions on FDI: Foreign equity limitations, screening or approval
mechanisms, restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel, and operational
restrictions4. This index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher number indicating more restrictions and
lower numbers meaning more openness. By definition, the OECD index is preferable than the de
jure financial globalization index because of its narrower focus on FDI policies. But the OECD
index suffers from its limited coverage, including 69 countries for the following years: 1997, 2003,
2006, and 2010 – 2018. Thus, when it is applied to this dissertation, there are only 45 countryyears. This is the primary reason I do not use it in regression models. But it is still a useful indicator
to test whether the policy indices I used to FDI policies, particularly when they encompass a wider
range of foreign investment policies, do not deviate too much from what I want to indicate. A
correlation test shows a Pearson’s R statistic with a value of -0.43 between the de jure financial
globalization index and the OECD FDI restrictiveness index. This moderate relationship suggests
that the de jure financial globalization index can still reflect the changes in FDI policies.
As I discussed in Chapter Two, because income inequality is a multi-faced issue, I also
account for alternative theories from political, economic, and sociodemographic perspectives.
Control variables include regime institutions, government education spending, international trade,
economic growth, unemployment rate, the elderly population, and education attainment.
Electoral competition index5 from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) (Coppedge et
al., 2019; Pemstein et al., 2019) is adopted to measure regime institutions. This index measures

The data can be obtained at https://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm.
This index is named v2x_polyarchy in the V-Dem dataset. It consists of five components: freedom of association,
clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage.
4
5

34

how each country performs in promoting electoral competition and voting rights based on
evaluations from country experts. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher numbers meaning
better performance. I make use of this index because electoral competition is understood as an
essential democratic institution as defined by Dahl (1973). Government spending on education is
measured by national education spending as a percentage of GDP. Data come from the World
Bank and government statistics, including Mainland China and Taiwan.
International trade is measured by total yearly volumes of imports and exports as a share of
GDP. Per capita GDP 6 indicates the levels of economic development in each country.
Unemployment rate indicates the share of unemployed individuals in the total labor force. The
elderly population is indicated by the share of individuals aged 65 and above in the total
population. Educational attainment is measured by human capital index from the Penn World
Table Version 9.1 (Feenstra et al., 2015). This index is computed based on the average years of
schooling from various data sources, including Barro and Lee (2013), Cohen and Leker (2014),
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). It also
incorporates an assumed rate of return to education based on Mincer equation estimates (Caselli,
2005; Psacharopoulos, 1994). This index is chosen over the average years of schooling used in
Barro and Lee (2013) because of longer time coverage.

Analysis and Estimation
The data used here cover nine countries and territories from 1980 to 2015, with totally 324
country-years. Because the time length (T) is larger than the number of units (N), my dataset is a

6

GDP per capita is adjusted for purchasing power parity in 2011 international dollars.
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TSCS dataset or a long panel. Two issues arise related to TSCS data: heterogeneity across units
and serial correlation across time. Heterogeneity concerns distinctive characteristics associated
with individual units, while serial correlation refers to the correlation between current values and
past values of a variable. Although unit heterogeneity is typically present at the national level, the
existence of serial correlation needs some proof. If serial correlation does not exist, fixed effects
models, as a commonly used static panel data estimator, can be employed to handle cross-national
unique attributes. Otherwise, dynamic panel data estimator is more appropriate.
A particular concern about serial correlation is that whether data are unit root, which is also
called nonstationary or integrated. With unit root present, previous values of a variable accumulate,
almost entirely, into the present and future values. When a unit-root variable is regressed on
another one, a significant relationship is likely to occur. However, this relationship could be either
meaning or spurious. If these two variables are cointegrated, the significant result reveals a longterm equilibrium relationship between them. This is particularly helpful for understanding longterm trends and making policy decisions. If the two variables are unrelated or not cointegrated, the
significant relationship is spurious, indicating false relationship largely due to integrated values.
To test whether regression results are meaning or spurious, researchers not only need to identify
whether data are unit root but also test whether cointegration is present. Test results, which are
reported in Appendix 2, show the existence of both integration and cointegration in most variables
of interest.
To analyze these integrated data, I employ error correction models (ECMs). As articulated in
De Boef and Keele (2008) and practiced in Morgan and Kelly (2013), the ECM is a very flexible
model, in which both integrated and stationary data can be analyzed. I also use robust-cluster
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standard errors to account for cross-national variation. The logic of ECMs is indicated by the
following equation:

In this equation, Y refers to the variable of interest, that is, market Gini in this dissertation,
while X refers to a vector including all independent variables or regressors. In an ECM, the
dependent variable is ΔYt, which is the difference between the current value of Y and the previous
value of Y. Yt-1 denotes the value of Y at the time of t-1. ΔXt refers to the difference between the
current value of X and the previous value of X, while Xt-1 denotes the value of X at the time of t-1.
When interpreting regression outputs, there are two parameters for each independent variable:
β1 for ΔXt and β2 for Xt-1. These two parameters indicate the short-term effect (β1) and the longterm effect (β2) of X, respectively. Although β1 is named the short-term effect, it does not mean
the influence of X on Y is short-lived. Instead, it indicates the initial impact on Y of X given a
change happened in X. The interpretation of β1 is as straightforward as parameters in OLS
estimator, which requires no further calculation. In contrast, extra computation is needed for the
long-term effect of X. To obtain the size of the long-term effect, we need to divide β2 by α1, which
is the parameter of the lagged Y. Thus, β1 and β2 indicate the impacts of X on Y in the short and
long terms, respectively. If either coefficient is statistically significant, it is appropriate to conclude
a significant relationship between X and Y.

Findings: FDI Inflows and Income Inequality
This section reports the statistical results of ECMs. To test the sensitiveness of the findings, I
also run robust checks by excluding cases including China (CHN), Hong Kong (HKG), and
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Singapore (SGP). As income gaps have worsened much faster in China than in other nations, China
is likely to be an influential case in the analyses. Hong Kong and Singapore are also tested due to
their unique nature of the small size and heavy reliance on economic globalization. It shows that
results from the models without these cases do not fundamentally differ from those from the full
sample. The results are reported in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1

FDI Inflows and Income Inequality
Model 1
Variables
Full
Without
Without
Sample
CHN
HKG and
SGP
Market Ginit-1
-0.02***
-0.01*
-0.02***
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Δ FDI
0.0004*
0.00017
0.0006*
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003)
FDIt-1
0.0006*
0.0001
0.0009**
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Δ Electoral competition index
-0.42
-0.26
-0.54
(0.30)
(0.26)
(0.34)
Electoral competition indext-1
0.02
0.24
-0.03
(0.16)
(0.17)
(0.14)
Δ Govt. Education spending
-0.04**
-0.03**
-0.02
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Govt. Education spendingt-1
-0.07**
-0.06**
-0.03
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Δ Trade
0.0013
0.0016
0.0008
(0.0008)
(0.001)
(0.0021)
Trade t-1
0.00003
0.0001
-0.0033
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0017)
Δ Logged GDP p.c.
1.02*
0.35
0.49
(0.45)
(0.38)
(0.57)
Logged GDP p.c.t-1
-0.04
0.08
0.03
(0.04)
(0.10)
(0.06)
Δ Unemployment rate
0.05
0.03
0.05
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Unemployment ratet-1
0.01
0.01
0.01
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
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Table 3.1 Continued
Δ Elderly population
Elderly populationt-1
Δ Human capital index
Human capital indext-1
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-0.48**
(0.20)
0.04**
(0.01)
-0.50
(0.60)
-0.12**
(0.05)
1.29***
(0.29)
315
0.38

-0.13
(0.16)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.68
(0.50)
-0.20***
(0.04)
0.18
(0.90)
280
0.26

-0.47
(0.24)
0.02
(0.02)
-3.28
(2.29)
-0.12
(0.12)
0.96*
(0.43)
245
0.46

Error correction models, cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. Two-tailed significance levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As the results reported in Table 3.1 show, FDI drives up income inequality in both short and
long terms. Taking the full sample of Model 1 as an example, in the short term, a 1-percent7
increase in yearly FDI inflows results in a 0.0004-point increase in the Gini index. Although the
coefficient seems to be small, the influence on income inequality should not be overlooked given
that FDI has increased rapidly in East Asia. For instance, FDI into China has grown by 5.52 percent
from 128.50 billion USD in 2014 to 135.61 billion in 2015. This increase is expected to result in
a rise of 0.002 point8 in the Gini index. On the other hand, to obtain the long-term effect of FDI, I
divide the coefficient for the lagged FDI (0.0006) by the absolute value of the coefficient for the
lagged market Gini (-0.02) and get a result of 0.039. This means that when annual FDI inflows
increase by 1 percent, the Gini index increases by 0.03 point in the long run. Using the same

Yearly inflows of FDI is measured in percentage form, that is, its unit is percentage.
This number is obtained by the following calculation: 0.0004*5.52=0.002
9 This number is obtained by dividing the coefficient for the lagged FDI with the absolute value of the coefficient for the
lagged market Gini, that is, 0.0006/|-0.02|=0.03.
7
8

39

example from China, a 5.52-percent increase in FDI between 2014 and 2015 will result in a 0.17point10 increase in the future.
The deleterious effect of FDI on income inequality is relatively consistent in robustness
checks when excluding China, Hong Kong, and Singapore, as shown in Table 3.1. China is indeed
an influential case. When excluding China from the sample, both the short- and long-term
distributional effects of FDI become smaller and insignificant, indicating that FDI seems to be less
harmful to other East Asian developing countries. This change may result from rapid growth in
FDI inflows and the Gini index at the same time. But the inequality-inducing effect of FDI is still
present in those areas. When excluding Hong Kong and Singapore, FDI remains to be detrimental
to income distribution. Even though these two areas have received large amounts of FDI compared
to other countries in East Asia over the past four decades, the exclusion of them does not weaken
the influence of FDI. To the contrary, FDI becomes slightly more influential in both short and long
terms without these two areas. Thus, when combining the results from the full sample and
robustness checks, I conclude that FDI inflows contribute to rising income inequality in East Asia
developing countries.

Findings: The Conditional Effect of FDI Policy Liberalization
To estimate how FDI policies condition the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows, I add
an interaction term between differenced FDI inflows and the differenced de jure financial
globalization index. As I proposed in the synthesized theoretical framework, I argue that when
FDI policies become more liberal, increases in FDI inflows become more detrimental to equal

10

This number is obtained by the following calculation: 0.03*5.52=0.17.
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income distribution. I used the first difference of both variables to indicate changes. A positive
value of the differenced de jure financial globalization index indicates liberalized FDI policies,
and a positive value of the differenced FDI inflows indicates increases in FDI inflows.
Results reported in Table 3.2 confirm my expectation. The positive coefficient for the
interaction term shows that when FDI policies become more liberal as indicated by larger numbers
of the de jure financial globalization index, the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows becomes
stronger. This conditional effect of FDI policies is relatively consistent in robustness checks. When
China is excluded from the sample, the coefficient for the interaction remains at the same level
with statistical significance. Hong Kong and Singapore are relatively influential because when
they are dropped from the sample, the distributional effect of FDI policies becomes insignificant.

Table 3.2

Policy Liberalization and Income Inequality
Model 2
Variables
Full
Without
Without
Sample
CHN
HKG and
SGP
Market Ginit-1
-0.02***
-0.01***
-0.02**
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
Δ FDI * Δ de jure Financial index 0.00004*
0.00004*
0.00003
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.000002)
Δ FDI
0.0005*
0.0002
0.0006
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
(0.0004)
FDIt-1
0.0006*
0.00004
0.0009*
(0.0003)
(0.0001)
(0.0004)
Δ de jure Financial index
0.0023
0.0046
0.0037*
(0.0023)
(0.0025)
(0.0018)
de jure Financial indext-1
0.0042
0.0053**
0.0085**
(0.0027)
(0.0020)
(0.0024)
Δ Electoral competition index
-0.33
-0.09
-0.36**
(0.21)
(0.19)
(0.12)
Electoral competition indext-1
-0.13
0.18
-0.34
(0.20)
(0.16)
(0.21)
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Table 3.2 Continued
Δ Govt. Education spending
Govt. Education spendingt-1
Δ Trade
Tradet-1
Δ Logged GDP p.c.
Logged GDP p.c.t-1
Δ Unemployment rate
Unemployment ratet-1
Δ Elderly population
Elderly populationt-1
Δ Human capital
Human capitalt-1
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-0.03**
(0.01)
-0.09***
(0.02)
0.0013
(0.0009)
-0.0003
(0.0004)
1.12*
(0.47)
-0.03
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.67**
(0.25)
0.04**
(0.01)
-0.97
(0.60)
-0.07
(0.06)
1.31***
(0.28)
280
0.51

-0.03**
(0.01)
-0.07***
(0.01)
0.0015
(0.0010)
-0.0003
(0.0004)
0.45
(0.38)
0.09
(0.07)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.00
(0.01)
-0.25
(0.14)
0.00
(0.01)
-1.08*
(0.44)
-0.15**
(0.05)
-0.10
(0.61)
245
0.43

-0.01
(0.01)
-0.03
(0.02)
0.0012
(0.0016)
-0.0042*
(0.0020)
0.69
(0.51)
-0.06
(0.06)
0.03
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.73**
(0.27)
0.02
(0.01)
-4.00
(2.95)
0.10
(0.16)
1.22**
(0.30)
210
0.61

Error correction models, cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. Two-tailed significance levels.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 3.1 charts the conditional effect of FDI policies on the relationship between FDI
inflows and income inequality based on the full sample of Model 2. Each line in this figure
represents a certain level of changes in FDI policies, with positive values indicating liberalization
and negative values meaning the opposite. The horizontal axis indicates yearly changes in FDI
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inflows as a share of GDP, while the vertical axis indicates how much changes will appear given
certain changes in FDI inflows and FDI policies.

Figure 3.1

Conditional Effect of FDI Policies

Note: Calculations by the author from estimates in Model 2 with the full sample, Table 3.2.

As Figure 3.1 shows, when there is no change toward policy liberalization as indicated by the
blue line, the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows is still present but weaker. When there is a
significant increase in policy liberalization, such as a 25-point increase11 indicated by the green
line, FDI inflows become particularly deleterious. For example, when FDI inflows maintain at the
same level, that is no increase in FDI inflows, a 25-point increase in policy liberalization will lead
to a 0.12-point increase in the Gini index. In comparison, under the same situation, if there is no
policy liberalization, income inequality will only deteriorate by 0.06 point. The conditional effect

11

A 25-point increase in policy liberalization is the largest yearly change in the sample.
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of FDI policies becomes even stronger when large increases in FDI inflows occur. For example,
when there is a 500-percent increase in FDI inflows, a 25-point change toward policy liberalization
will result in a 0.80-point increase in the Gini index. In contrast, the impact on income inequality
will be a 0.29-point increase when there is no change in FDI policies.
Analyses presented above demonstrate that FDI policy liberalization is indeed involved in the
distributional effect of FDI inflows. As FDI policies become more liberalized, FDI inflows become
more harmful to equal income distribution. The conditional effect of FDI policy liberalization is
particularly strong when FDI inflows increase rapidly. But the aforementioned analyses do not
offer explanations about how policy liberalization condition the inequality-inducing effect of FDI
inflows. I propose that policy liberalization affects income distribution through two channels:
regional distribution and sectoral distribution of FDI inflows. With significant liberalization in
policies, FDI inflow not only become widely dispersed across geographies but also begin to flood
into services and technology-intensive industries. As FDI inflows become an unseparated part of
receiving nations, they affect income distribution by three mechanisms I discussed above: interenterprise wage-premiums, skill-based wage-premiums, and wage polarization between
occupations within service sectors. As FDI inflows become equally distributed across the host
economy due to policy liberalization, inter-enterprise wage premiums and skill-based wage
premiums become more pronounced, leading to rising income inequality. When FDI inflows are
allowed to enter service sectors because of liberalized policies, wage polarization between
occupation within service sectors becomes influential, resulting in growing income disparities as
well. In other words, FDI policy liberalization intensifies the inequality-inducing effect of FDI
inflows via regional openness and sectoral openness.
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Moving to Case Study
To demonstrate how policy liberalization first shapes regional and sectoral distribution of FDI
and then influence income distribution, I conduct case studies on China and Korea in Chapter Four
and Chapter Five, respectively. There are three reasons why these two nations are chosen. First,
these two cases are analyzed to illustrate how FDI policy liberalization shapes the inequalityinducing effect of FDI. In this case, Lieberman (2005) suggests the selection of cases should be
based on whether they are well predicted by statistical models. The selection of Korea satisfies
this criterion, given that its residuals in both Model 112 and Model 213 are the smallest. China is
the opposite case because its residuals are the largest in both two models. I argue that if analysis
on a case that does not well fit statistical models still offers some support for a particular causal
model or theory, the validity of that model or theory may be extremely high. The analyses
presented in Chapter Four show that the Chinese case does support the conditional effect of FDI
policy liberalization. Thus, the selection of China is still helpful for theory development.
Second, these two countries have witnessed the largest policy changes regarding FDI in East
Asia. This perfectly fits the second criterion set by Lieberman (2005) that the selected cases for
SNA should have the widest variation on the key independent variable(s). As the KOF dataset
reports, the de jure financial globalization index in China has increased by 42.45 points between
1980 and 2015, while the change in Korea is even larger with a value of 47.14 points. Such
noticeable policy liberalization potentially provides more historical details and offers strong

The average residuals for each case are: China (0.11), Hong Kong (0.03), Indonesia (0.2), Korea (0.004), Malaysia
(-0.06), the Philippines (-0.02), Singapore (0.04), Taiwan (-0.04), and Thailand (-0.07).
13 The average residuals for each case are: China (0.11), Hong Kong (0.01), Indonesia (-0.43), Korea (-0.02), Malaysia
(-0.04), the Philippines (-0.02), Singapore (0.03), and Thailand (-0.02). Taiwan is missing due the de jure financial
globalization index does not cover it.
12
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support for my argument that FDI policy liberalization conditions the distributional effect of FDI
inflows.
Third, my choice of these two cases is also dictated by data constraints. My analyses on these
two nations combine a review of FDI policy changes and time-series analyses. By tracing the
changes in FDI policies over the past four decades, I present the nature of policy liberalization in
both nations. Based on the historical details and the synthesized theoretical framework I proposed
in Chapter Two, I employ time-series analyses to identify the mechanism, by which FDI policy
liberalization shapes the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows. Because publicly accessible
data about these two nations cover longer time spans than those from other nations, these two cases
are preferable than other cases.
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Chapter Four China: Policy Liberalization and Income Inequality
Over the past four decades, China has experienced glaring income inequality, with achieving
impressive economic growth at the same time. Income inequality, indicated by the market Gini
index1 from the SWIID, started at a level of 30.8 in 1980, making China one of the most equal
societies in East Asia. Thirteen-five years later, the Gini index has reached 46.9, pushing China to
become one of the most unequal societies in the world. Figure 4.1 displays the sharp upward trend
of income inequality between 1980 and 2015. As it shows, income disparities began to deteriorate
rapidly in the mid-1980s. After reaching an unprecedented level of around 47 in the early 2010s,
the upward trend of income inequality finally slowed down and levelled off.

Figure 4.1

Income Inequality in China
Data Source: SWIID.

1

This Gini index ranges between 0 and 100, with higher numbers indicating severer inequality.
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Soaring income inequality has attracted considerable scholarly attention (Some recent studies
include Davis & Wang, 2009; Knight & Song, 2003, 2005; Wang, 2008; Whyte, 2012, 2014; Xie,
2016; Xie & Zhou, 2014). It is widely acknowledged that China’s income inequality is featured
by two characteristics: rural-urban division and regional disparities2. Regional disparities refer to
unequal economic development and associated income gaps across provinces and municipalities
(for simplicity, I use provinces in the following discussion) located in the eastern, middle, and
western region 3. Existing studies have identified several institutional factors that contribute to
China’s fast-escalating income inequality: the household registration system (Hukou system) and
associated discrimination against rural residents (Liu, 2005; Lu & Wang, 2013; Sicular et al., 2007;
Wang, 2005), favorable policies for urban areas (Lu & Gao, 2011; Yang, 1999), earlier openness
policies in the eastern provinces (Litwack & Qian, 1998; Tsui, 2007), and communist legacies like
work unit (Danwei) (Whyte, 2014; Xie & Wu, 2008).
The effect of FDI inflows on income inequality have been investigated in recent studies,
mostly written by economists. There are generally two theoretical arguments about how FDI
inflows shape income distribution in China. The first theory argues that the uneven distribution of
FDI inflows across geography increases regional inequality, which is a significant component of
the overall income inequality. Strictly speaking, this theory is not targeting foreign capital itself,
but rather the distribution of it. It assumes that foreign capital is more productive than domestic
capital. Due to China’s gradual openness policies to foreign investors, regional inequality is

For a detailed discussion on the rural-urban division, check Yang and Cai (2003) and Guang et al. (2010). For a
overview of existing discussion on regional disparities, check Kanbur and Zhang (2005).
3 There are 31 provincial-level administrative units in Mainland China: 22 provinces, 4 municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin,
Shanghai, and Chongqing), 5 autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Ningxia, and Xinjiang). According
to National Bureau of Statistics, there are 12 units in the eastern region, 9 units in the middle region, and 10 units in
the western region.
2
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primarily attributed to the differences in the amount of foreign investment, instead of foreign
investment itself. An early study by Chen and Fleisher (1996) found that FDI inflows generated
disparities in economic development between coastal and non-coastal regions from 1978 to 1993.
However, the inequality-rising effect of FDI inflows began to weaken since the mid-1990s, which
is arguably due to China’s development programs designed to benefit the western provinces.
Similar findings are also reported in later studies (Fleisher et al., 2010; Kanbur & Zhang, 2005;
Wan et al., 2007; Zhang & Zhang, 2003). By analyzing the largest panel dataset including all the
provinces from 1979 to 2003, Wei et al. (2009) confirmed that the uneven distribution of FDI
inflows, not FDI inflows per se, significantly contribute to regional growth differences in China.
Another group of scholars have focused on inter-enterprise wage differentials, more
specifically higher incomes offered by FIEs. Multiple reasons, mostly from economics, have been
proposed to explain why that is the case: advanced technologies that make FIEs more profitable,
higher compensation for labor due to government restrictions or the segmented labor market,
internal fairness policies to reduce income disparities between FIEs and branches in other nations,
and reducing labor turnover to prevent the leakage of intangible and firm-specific assets like
managerial skills (Chen et al., 2011). Empirical evidence has mostly shown the existence of a
foreign wage premium (Chen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2011; Knight & Song, 2003; Zhao, 2002).
This dissertation adds policy liberalization to the ongoing debates on the relationship between
FDI inflows and income inequality. Specifically, I make two arguments about how FDI policy
liberalization contributes to rising income inequality in China. First, building on studies on interenterprise wage differentials, I argue that FDI policy liberalization significantly deteriorates
income inequality in China via an equal regional distribution of FDI inflows. Because of
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enterprise-based and skill-based wage premiums, increasing FDI inflows due to FDI policy
liberalization amplify wage differentials across enterprises and across skill-levels, ultimately
exacerbating the overall income inequality. This argument is quite different from, although not
incompatible with, the first group of literature focusing on FDI inflows and differences in
economic development across provinces in China. Results of time-series analyses support my
argument. As China becomes more open to foreign investors, the regional distribution of FDI
inflows has become more equal. This trend has contributed to rising income inequality in China
over the past three decades.
Another argument I make is that FDI policy liberalization also exacerbates income inequality
when it opens service sectors to foreign investors. Studies have shown the effect of FDI on wage
polarization within service sectors (Bogliaccini & Egan, 2017; Evans & Timberlake, 1980). Based
on their findings, I posit that when liberalized FDI policies open service sectors to foreigners in
China, the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows on wage polarization will get enhanced,
leading to severer income inequality. Although FDI policy liberalization does not directly cause
wage differentials with service sectors and later rising income inequality, it contributes to growing
income gaps by creating opportunities for FDI inflows to enter service sectors.
To empirically test my arguments about policy liberalization, regional and sectoral distribution
of FDI, and income inequality, I review the history of FDI policies in China and run time-series
analyses. My analyses are presented in the following two sections. The first section describes the
evolvement of FDI in China with respect to FDI policies. Policy changes are reflected in the
dynamics of FDI, including annual inflows, regional distribution, and sectoral distribution. With
FDI policies becoming more open to the international investment community, FDI inflows have
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become more equally allocated across provinces in China, and an increasing amount of foreign
capital has been directed toward service sectors. The second section provides statistical evidence
showing an equal regional distribution of FDI and more FDI inflows to services exacerbate income
inequality. I conclude this chapter with a summary.

The Development of FDI in China
As a key part of China’s opening-up and economic reforms, FDI has undergone drastic
changes since 1979. In 1980, the first year after the passing of the first foreign investment law, the
yearly inflow of FDI was 57 million USD, according to the UNCTAD4. In 2015, that number
reached 135.61 billion USD. Along with sharp increases in FDI inflows, FDI policies have been
noticeably liberalized. Major policy changes include opening more sectors to FDI, relaxing
restrictions on maximum foreign ownership, providing attractive tax incentives, and streamlining
administrative procedures. Four decades after the first equity joint venture, Beijing Air Catering
Corporate, approved in 1980, FDI has become a significant part of the Chinese economy and has
been widely praised as one pillar of China’s economic success (e.g. Baharumshah & Thanoon,
2006; Tang et al., 2008; Yao & Wei, 2007).
In this section, I first summarize the evolvement of China’s FDI policies5. By examining these
policies, I demonstrate how China has become increasingly open to foreign investors in a relatively
short period. Highlights will be given to ownership restrictions, regional openness, and sectoral
openness because they indicate how widely and deeply FDI has been present in the Chinese
economy. The second half of this section reports the changes in the amount of FDI inflows and the

4
5

FDI data can be obtained at https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740.
For a more thorough review of China’s FDI policies, check Chen (1997) and Ng (2013).
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allocation of FDI inflows across regions and industries based on data from the National Bureau of
Statistics of China (hereafter NBS)6.

1) FDI Policies in China
Over the period from 1979 to 2019, FDI into China has been administrated under three laws
and multiple related amendments and policies: The Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (EJV
Law) in 1979, the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law (WFOE Law) in 1986, and the SinoForeign Cooperative Joint Venture Law (CJV Law) in 1988. These three laws and related
amendments have provided guidance to foreign investors and have managed FDI inflows until the
newly made Foreign Investment Law came into effect on January 1st, 20207.
There are three major forms of foreign direct investment in China: equity joint ventures
(EJVs), cooperative joint ventures (CJVs), and wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFEs). First,
EJVs are set up with joint capital by foreign investors and domestic partners. According to the EJV
law, foreign investment needs to be at least 25 percent of the total capital when forming an EJV.
This number is much higher than those in other countries, such as 10 percent in the United States
(Huang, 2003). EJV is the earliest form of FDI in China and has accounted for most FDI inflows
during the 1980s. Second, CJVs were given legal status in 1988 under the CJV Law, although this
form of FDI had already appeared before the passing of the CJV law. The occurrence of CJVs was
mainly due to the strict requirements of forming and operating EJVs, including the required
threshold of foreign capital, restrictions on profits and losses, and strict legal procedures. CJVs
were also set up by foreign investors and domestic partners but with more flexibility. This form of

6
7

The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics can be accessed at http://www.stats.gov.cn/.
Because the influence of this new law still remains to be seen, it is not studied here.
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FIEs was particularly welcomed during the 1980s. Lastly, foreign capital was given the whole
ownership according to the WFOE Law of 1986, although not all economic sectors were accessible
to exclusive foreign ownership. According to the WFOE Law, whole ownership is allowed when
the enterprises are beneficial to the Chinese economy and adopt advanced technologies and
equipment, or when they are expected to export all or most of their products. Although this law
legalizes wholly foreign ownership, the number of WFOEs is still subject to how many economic
sectors and industries are open to foreign investors.
Although the three FDI laws were enacted in the 1980s, not all provinces were open to the
international investment community. It takes about 20 years to open China from the initial four
Special Economic Zones (hereafter SEZs) to the western provinces. In 1980, four cities, namely
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen, were approved by the central government as the SEZs.
The first three are located in Guangdong province, and the last is in Fujian province. Being viewed
as a pioneering laboratory for more extensive economic reforms, these SEZs were given the
highest levels of autonomy to manage their economies, like offering attractive tax incentives to
foreign investors (Chen, 1997).
After observing the rapid accumulation of FDI inflows, particularly from oversea Chinese in
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and its positive influence on economic growth, Chinese leaders
announced the opening of another fourteen coastal cities8 and Hainan Island in 1984. As being
located in the Pacific Rim, these areas were expected to make China more open to its East Asian
neighbors and the globe as well. In these coastal cities, the Economic and Technological

Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou,
Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai.
8
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Development Zones (ETDZs) were established to attract FDI. Similar, but less generous compared
to the SEZs, tax incentives were offered in these ETDZs to foreign investors.
It did not take long for China to extend the open-door policy to the neighboring coastal areas
later and the entire coastal region under the Coastal Development Strategy in 1988 eventually.
After the landmark “Southern Tour” to the southern opened areas and the SEZs, Deng Xiaoping
explicitly supported for a market-oriented reform and more areas opened for FDI. As a result, cities
in the inland provinces, including almost all provincial capitals9, major cities, border cities and
counties in the west and the north, became open to FDI in the following years. Across China,
various types of economic development zones were established to offer tax incentives, simplified
administrative procedures, and other favorable treatments. It has been documented that almost
2,000 economic development zones were set up in 1992 (Shirk, 1994).
With respect to sectoral openness, there has been significant liberalization over the past four
decades. Between 1979 and 1995, although foreign investors had gained legal access to the
Chinese market, the scope of industries, where FDI could enter, was not transparent to the
international investment community. The first Foreign Investment Industry Guidance
Catalogue (hereafter the Investment Catalogue) was promulgated in 1995. The Investment
Catalogue classified industries into four categories: encouraged, permitted, restricted, and
prohibited. Foreign investment was encouraged in areas including agriculture, manufacturing,
advanced technology and equipment, sustainable development, and where it is beneficial for the
western and middle region of China. Restricted areas were where a maximum shareholding was
set up for foreign capital. Restrictions were designed to protect domestic producers, rare minerals,

9

Except for Lhasa in Tibet and Urumqi in Xinjiang.
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and industries prioritized by state development plans. Prohibited areas included sectors related to
national security, environment protection, public health, land protection, military facility and
equipment, special technologies possessed by China, etc. Sectors that did not fall into these three
categories were open to foreign investors with subjection to administrative requirements.
From 1995 to 2015, the Investment Catalogue has been amended eight times10. A general
trend emerges from these amendments: substantive liberalization in most industries but with
priorities and restrictions set by the government. Several significant changes need to be
highlighted. First, advanced technology and equipment have been prioritized and highly
encouraged by the Chinese government. Second, given that nowadays, traditional manufacturing
products can be produced by domestic companies, they have been recategorized as restricted areas.
Third, restrictions on financial sector, real estate, and other service sectors have been removed.
Part of the removal was due to China’s commitments to joining the WTO. Fourth, environment
protection and sustainable development are given more attention. Fifth, new restrictions have been
placed on streaming, broadcasting, newspaper, telecom, social media, and other areas that can
potentially influence people’s views.
These changes in FDI policies are reflected in the de jure financial globalization index11 from
the KOF Globalization Index dataset, as reported in Table 4.1. FDI policies became significantly
liberalized, particularly during the 1990s and 2000s. During the 1990s, this de jure financial
globalization index had reached 34.30, showing a 13-point increase from the 1980s. But year 1992,

The investment Catalogue was amended in 1997, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2017, and 2019.
As I described in Chapter Three, by definition, FDI policies are not the only policy area quantified in this index. But a
correlation test shows there is a strong correlation between the lagged values of this policy index and yearly inflows of
FDI in China from 1970 to 2015 with a value of 0.84. This may make the de jure financial globalization index a proper
indicator showing the changes in FDI policies.
10
11
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when Deng Xiaoping made the landmark “Southern Tour”12 to promote deeper economic reforms
after seeing the benefits of economic openness, did not stand out as a significant year for FDI
policy liberalization, even though yearly inflows of FDI exploded since then as shown in next
subsection. Instead, China made serious commitments to facilitate its accession to the WTO,
resulting in more open policies to FDI. The first decade of the twenty-first century observed a
continuation of FDI policy liberalization, with the average number of FDI policy index reaching
45.62. Policy liberalization slowed down since 2010, with an average value of 47.06 slightly higher
than the previous ten years.

Table 4.1
1980 – 1989
21.00

FDI Policy Liberalization in China
1990 – 2001
34.30

2002 – 2010
45.62

2010 – 2015
47.06

Data source: KOF.

2) Dynamics of FDI into China
Between 1979 and 2015, FDI yearly inflows have continuously been on an upward trend, as
shown in Figure 4.2. This increasing trend can be divided into two distinct periods given the speeds
of FDI inflows: before 1992 and after 1992. Between 1979 and 1991, yearly inflows of FDI had
grown from 0.08 million USD to 4.36 billion USD. This expansion was indeed noticeable given
the volume of 1991 was 54.58 thousand times the volume of 1979. However, the upward trend
during this period was overshadowed by the second period after 1992. Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern
Tour” in early 1992 marked as a significant turning point for active promotion of FDI and other

12

From January 18th to February 21st, 1992.
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economic reforms. From 1979 to 1991, the average yearly inflow of FDI stayed around 1.8 billion
USD. In 1992, the number increased significantly to 11 billion, which was at least five-fold. Since
then, yearly volumes of FDI have risen sharply with slight slowdowns in a few years. In 2015, the
annual FDI inflow reached 135.61 billion USD. This impressive cumulation of FDI has made
China the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries since the early 1990s, according to
the UNCTAD13.
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Figure 4.2

FDI Yearly Inflows to China

Data source: UNCTAD. Unit: USD in billions at current prices.

Along with fast-growing FDI inflows to China, geographic distribution of FDI at the
provincial level has become more equal. During the early 1980s, FDI largely concentrated in the
four SEZs established in 1980. These SEZs have served to test new FDI policies and how FDI

13

FDI data can be obtained at https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740.
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facilitates economic growth in China. Due to their proximity to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan,
they have attracted large flows from these three regions in the early years. After observing the
initial success of attracting FDI, China gradually opened more coastal cities in 1984, the inland
provinces in the early 1990s, and finally the western provinces in the late 1990s. Although not all
provinces have been equally successful in absorbing a large amount of FDI due to reasons like
lack of skilled labor, lack of infrastructure and transportation, inefficient enforcement of
investment policies, and local regulatory barriers (Ng, 2013; Wei et al., 2009), regional distribution
of FDI has become more equal. These changes are reflected in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3

Jiangsu

Guangdong

Top Three Recipients of FDI Inflows

Data Source: NBS. Contract numbers of FDI in registered enterprises.

Figure 4.3 presents how geographic dispersion of FDI has evolved in China based on the data
from the NBS. Ideally, the utilized amounts of FDI in each province should be used here. But the
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NBS has only reported the registered amounts of FDI in contracts from 1997. Although these
numbers are larger than the volumes of FDI actually used, they may still serve as a useful proxy
indicating to what extent provinces are attractive to foreign investors.
From 1994 to 2015, FDI has become more equally allocated across China, according to Figure
4.3. Guangdong province has long been the winner because it received the largest share of annual
FDI inflows. A notable decreasing trend, however, has also been documented since the beginning.
In 1994, the share of FDI received by Guangdong province was 38.26 percent. This number was
down to 14.84 percent in 2015. The decline is largely attributed to the rising popularity of other
regions. For example, Jiangsu province and Shanghai city were the second and third largest
recipients in 1994, but they only received 6.76 percent and 7.56 percent of yearly FDI inflow,
respectively. In 2015, they both overtook Guangdong and became the two most popular locations
favored by foreign investors.
In the meantime, other provinces have also observed higher inflows of FDI over the past two
decades. To illustrate the increasingly equal allocation of FDI across provinces in China, I calculate
the coefficient of variation (CV), which is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of FDI14.
This statistic indicates the extent to which FDI inflows are dispersed across China. Higher values
represent greater variation in the regional distribution of FDI inflows. According to Figure 4.4, the
coefficient of variation has significantly declined from 2.06 in 1994 to 1.41 in 2015. This decline
suggests that although Jiangsu and Shanghai have risen to the top, other provinces and

Two western provinces, Xinjiang and Xizang, are not included in calculation here and also later regression analysis
due to their higher economic dependence on the central government and lack of data. One municipality, Chongqing, is
not covered, either, because it obtained the status of municipality in 1997. Thus, there are totally 28 provincial-level
units in my calculation and later time-series analyses as well.
14
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municipalities have also managed to catch up with them. FDI has become more evenly dispersed
within China.
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Figure 4.4

Coefficient of Variation of FDI Inflows

Data Source: NBS. Contract numbers of FDI in registered enterprises.

As FDI into China has expanded significantly over the past four decades, the forms of FDI
have also undergone noticeable changes. As I discussed above, there are three main forms of FDI
in China: EJVs, CJVs, and WFOEs. EJV is the earliest form of FDI, which requires joint
participation of foreign investors and domestic partners. CJVs also require both inputs from
foreigners and domestic partners, but with fewer requirements compared to EJVs. In contrast to
EJVs and CJVs, WFOEs allow full foreign ownership to foreign investors. Figure 4.5 displays the
trends of the numbers of these three forms between 1979 and 2015. During the early years, EJVs
had maintained as the most popular form of FDI. In 1994, EJVs accounted for 58.66 percent of
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firms with foreign investment. Although data is only available as early as 1994, it is reasonable to
suspect the percentage of EJVs could be higher.
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Numbers of Three Forms of FDI in China
Data source: NBS. Unit: Percentage.

However, because of the rising popularity of WFOEs, EJVs lost the majority status to WFOEs
in 1997. Even since then, the number of EJVs had been on a downward trend until 2012 when the
lowest value of 17.47 percent was reached. Although the shares of EJVs have increased slowly
since 2012, EJVs only accounted for 22.54 percent of total FIEs in 2015. Like EJVs, the share of
CJVs has declined significantly between 1994 and 2015. The number was 13.95 percent in 1994,
while it dropped to 0.41 percent in 2015. Although CJVs give more flexibility to foreign investors
and domestic partners, they have become an insignificant part of the Chinese economy. Contrary
to the declining significance of EJVs and CJVs, WFOEs have become extremely popular in China.
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In 1994, the share of WFOEs was only 27.35 percent. But three years later, in 1997 WFOEs had
overtaken EJVs (42.86 percent) to become the major form of FDI with 45.72 percent of newly
established firms exclusively controlled by foreign capital. The increasing popularity and
significance of WFOEs had continued until 2012 when its share reached its peak of 81.65 percent.
Although a slight decrease has been documented since then, WFOEs have secured their dominant
status in China. The changing significance of EJVs, CJVs, and WFOEs can also be found in the
amounts of FDI inflows invested in them, as shown in Figure 4.6.
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As Figure 4.6 presents, both EJVs and CJVs have increasingly received less FDI. The shares
of annual FDI inflows to EJVs have fallen from 43.00 percent in 1997 to 20.50 percent in 2015,
and the numbers for CJVs have also dropped from 19.73 percent to 1.46 percent. In other words,
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EJVs still receive a significant, although declining, amount of FDI every year, while CJVs have
been much more insignificant compared to the early years. In contrast, WFOEs have received an
increasing amount of foreign investment each year. The shares of FDI inflows to WFOEs have
constantly grown from 35.77 percent in 1997 to 79.24 percent in 2014, reaching the peak over the
past two decades.
With increasing amounts of FDI into China, foreign investment has been widely dispersed
across economic sectors and industries. This is not saying that FDI has been equally distributed,
but rather compared to other developing countries, foreign investors obtained access to a wider
range of industries in China (Huang, 2003). Figure 4.7 reports the trends of FDI inflows to three
economic sectors. This figure presents how FDI inflows have been allocated in three economic
sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Although the early years of FDI inflows, namely
from 1979 to 1996, are not covered in data, existing data still display clear trends of how FDI
inflows have been distributed. Agriculture has received the least amounts of FDI inflows with its
shares always under 2 percent over the past 20 years. Although the absolute volumes of FDI into
agriculture have been rising, the presence of foreign investors is much weaker in agriculture.
Second, manufacturing sectors had received most FDI inflows between 1997 and 2009 with its
shares ranging between 52 and 71 percent of total FDI. The number reached its peak in 2004 with
a value of 71 percent. A downward trend, however, has been documented since then. Although
manufacturing sectors continue to receive a significant part of FDI inflows, they only accounted
for 31.32 percent in 2015. In contrast, service sectors have presented an opposite trend. From 1997
to 2004, the shares of FDI inflows to service sectors had stayed stably around 25 percent under the
dominance of manufacturing sectors. Since 2004 when a new version of Investment Catalogue
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was published with significant liberalization of service sectors, foreign investors began to shift
their preferences to service sectors. As a result, service sectors surpassed manufacturing in 2010
and became the most popular destinations of FDI in the following years.
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FDI and Income Inequality: Regional and Sectoral Openness
As shown above, FDI has become an inseparable part of China’s economic openness. From
1980 to 2015, FDI policies have been liberalized significantly. As a result, yearly inflows of FDI
have impressively increased to unprecedented levels with more equal regional distribution and
deeper penetration in service sectors. However, the rapid cumulation of foreign capital seems to
coincide with the sharp take-off of income inequality. In this section, I explore whether and to
what extent FDI has contributed to worsening income inequality in China from two perspectives:
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regional and sectoral distribution of FDI. As presented in the previous section, FDI policy
liberalization in China is featured by two characteristics: greater regional openness and greater
sectoral openness. I explore how these changes have altered income distribution in China.
One strand of existing literature argues that FDI inflows lead to higher regional inequality
because it generates uneven economic development across provinces in China. A premise that this
group of literature commonly holds is that FDI inflows are beneficial to economic growth. Higher
inequality is a result of unequal distribution of FDI inflows, rather than FDI inflows themselves
(Wei et al., 2009; Zhang & Zhang, 2003). In this group of literature, regional inequality is typically
measured based on GDP per capita at the provincial level. Thus, regional inequality in these studies
does not indicate how unequal income distribution is, but rather how some provinces are more
economically advanced than others. Their findings suggest that liberalized policies and then a more
equal allocation of FDI inflows would significantly narrow regional differences in economic
growth.
Inspired by, although being quite different from, this scholarly line, I argue that an equal
allocation of FDI inflows, which results from more open FDI policies, would unexpectedly
increase income inequality. Here, I want to stress that I examine different outcomes compared to
those who study regional inequality. Although all of us are interested in inequality, what we want
to explain is quite different. This dissertation here aims to explore how income inequality is shaped
by FDI inflows, while previous studies on regional inequality explain how differences in economic
development across provinces are affected by FDI inflows. It is possible that equal regional
allocation of FDI not only narrows gaps in per capita GDP across provinces, but also amplifies
income gaps within provinces and later the overall income inequality. Per capita GDP does not
65

indicate how the benefits of economic development are distributed across individuals within a
province. If the growing economic pie is unevenly distributed, it is likely that strong economic
growth produced by FDI results in a higher level of per capita GDP and a more unequal society at
the same time. When these happen, we would observe rising income gaps along with a more equal
allocation of FDI inflows within a nation. This is my first hypothesis.
My second hypothesis emphasizes how FDI policy liberalization shapes income distribution
via sectoral distribution of FDI inflows. More specifically, I hypothesize that when service sectors
receive an increasing amount of FDI due to liberalized policies, income inequality in China also
deteriorates. This is because FDI inflows are found to be associated with larger wage differentials
between different occupations within service sectors. As foreign capital increasingly flows into
services sectors, its inequality-inducing effect becomes more pronounced. Although Bogliaccini
and Egan (2017) have confirmed that FDI inflows to service sectors contribute to rising income
inequality, their sample did not include China. My analyses provide evidence from China.
To test my first hypothesis, I employ ECMs with the first difference of the market Gini index
as the dependent variable and the CV of FDI as the key independent variable. As stated before, the
CV measures how provinces differ from each other with respect to the amount of FDI they received
at a given year. Higher values indicate larger variation in yearly FDI inflows across provinces. As
Figure 4.4 shows, the CV has become smaller over the past few decades. Does this mean a more
equal geographic distribution of FDI inflows? My answer is “Yes, but it means more than that”.
On the one hand, a smaller CV definitely means that provinces in China have become not as
different from each other as before with respect to how much FDI they have received. In this case,
regional distribution of FDI inflows is more equal than before. On the other hand, increasing
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inflows of FDI to each province may also be a consequence of greater sectoral openness, not just
greater regional openness. A correlation test15 between the CV and the shares of FDI inflows to
service sectors supports this interpretation with a value of -0.85. Smaller values of the CV are
associated with increasing shares of FDI inflows to services. Thus, a significant relationship
between the CV and the Gini index, if found in regression models, may be a function of both
regional distribution and sectoral distribution of FDI inflows. To separate these two aspects of FDI
policy liberalization, I also include the shares of FDI inflows to servicers in ECMs. In this case, I
examine the effects of regional distribution and sectoral distribution of FDI at the same time.
GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and government spending on education are included as
control variables. Due to the small sample size, these control variables are included in models
separately. Similar to what I present in Chapter Three, unit root tests and cointegration tests are
conducted before running ECMs. Detailed test results are presented in Appendix 3. A quick
overview of these tests is that market Gini, the CV of FDI inflows, GDP per capita, unemployment
rate, government spending on education, percentages of FDI inflows to manufacturing and services
are all unit root or integrated at the first order. But cointegration, or a long-term equilibrium
relationship, only exists between the Gini index and the CV, and between the Gini index and
unemployment rate. Thus, to avoid spurious relationship produced by other control variables, the
lagged terms of GDP per capita, government spending on education, percentages of FDI into
manufacturing and services are not included in ECMs.
Results are reported in Table 4.2. The coefficients for the lagged market Gini from all the
models are significant, indicating serial correlation has been corrected. All the models show

15

Pearson’s R statistic
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negative coefficients for the CV of FDI inflows, suggesting that a more equal distribution of FDI
inflows leads to more serious income inequality in both short and long terms. Taking Model 1 as
an example, the short-term effect of the CV of FDI is -6.40. This means that when the CV increases
by 1 unit, the Gini index decreases by 6.40 points. Given that the CV has decreased in China,
income inequality is expected to climb up. The average yearly change of the CV is -0.03, indicating
a more equal regional distribution of FDI. When the CV of FDI drops by 0.03 point on average
each year, a 0.19-point16 increase occurs in the Gini index in the short term. The long-term effect
of the CV is more concerning with a value of -13.6117. A 1-unit decrease in the CV results in a
13.61-point increase in income inequality. This finding seems to be much more worrisome due to
such a large magnitude of the long-term effect. But a more practical interpretation of this result
needs to consider the trend of the CV in the Chinese context. Because the annual value of the CV
drops by 0.03 point on average, it leads to a 0.41-point18 increase in the Gini index in the long run.
Model 2 and Model 3 also report results that an equal regional distribution of FDI inflows
contributes to widening income gaps both in the short and long terms.
To control the possibility that a smaller CV also indicates greater sectoral openness, I include
the shares of FDI inflows to services and manufacturing sectors in Model 4 and Model 5,
respectively. Due to the shorter coverage of these two variables, the sample size of these two
models drops to 18 years (1997 – 2015). The results from these two models further confirm that
an equal distribution of FDI across geography exacerbates, rather than mitigates, income gaps.

This number is obtained by the following equation: 0.19= -6.40*-0.03.
This number is obtained by dividing the coefficient for the lagged CV with the absolute value of the coefficient for the
lagged market Gini, that is, -4.22/|-0.31|=-13.61.
18 This number is obtained by the following equation: 0.41=-13.61*-0.03
16
17
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Both the short- and long-term effects are statistically significant and consistent with the results
from the first three models with longer time coverage.
By combining all the results from Table 4.2, I conclude that a wider regional distribution of
FDI inflows leads to a more unequal society in China. The short-term effect of equal dispersion of
FDI, indicated by smaller CVs, raise the Gini index by a range of 5.23 and 6.79 points. In the
meantime, it drives ups income inequality in the long term with a scale of 13.61 to 16.63 points19.
As provinces and cities in China become more open to foreign investors, income inequality
deteriorates significantly. This finding is quite different from, although not contradictory to, the
wide-spread notion that an equal distribution of FDI inflows would result in smaller gaps in
economic growth between provinces.

Table 4.2

FDI Inflows and Income Inequality in China

Variables
Market Ginit-1
Δ CV of FDI
CV of FDI t-1
Δ Unemployment rate
Unemployment rate t-1
Δ Logged FDI

Model 1
-0.31***
(0.04)
-6.40***
(2.09)
-4.22***
(1.11)
0.02
(0.23)
0.50***
(0.17)

Model 2
-0.28***
(0.04)
-5.23**
(1.81)
-4.06***
(0.93)
0.12
(0.20)
0.31*
(0.16)
5.28**
(1.98)

Δ Govt. education spending

Model 3
-0.38***
(0.06)
-6.79***
(2.02)
-6.32***
(1.73)
-0.07
(0.23)
0.39**
(0.18)

Model 4
-0.35***
(0.10)
-5.77**
(2.51)
-5.18
(2.89)
0.02
(0.28)
0.42*
(0.23)

Model 5
-0.37***
(0.11)
-5.96**
(2.54)
-5.90*
(3.26)
-0.01
(0.28)
0.39
(0.24)

-3.15
(2.06)

Δ FDI into services

0.01
(0.01)

Δ FDI into manufacturing

-0.01
(0.01)

By dividing the coefficients for the lagged CV with the absolute value of the coefficients for the lagged market Gini, I
obtain the long-term effect of the CV for each model: -13.61 (Model 1), -14.50 (Model 2), -16.63 (Model 3), -14.80
(Model 4), -15.95 (Model 5).
19
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Table 4.2 Continued
Constant
Observations (years)
R-squared

18.32***
(3.50)
21
0.83

18.35*** 28.30***
(2.58)
(5.11)
21
21
1994 – 2015
0.89
0.86

30.59*** 33.66***
(7.02)
(7.53)
18
18
1997 – 2015
0.86
0.86

Error correction models. Two-tailed significance levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The effects of sectoral openness of FDI are presented in Model 4 and Model 5. Only the first
differences of the percentages of FDI inflows to services and manufacturing are included in models
because there is no cointegration between these two variables and the Gini index. The results from
both models suggest that sectoral allocation of FDI inflows matters for income inequality. More
specifically, higher FDI inflows to service sectors increase income gaps, while more FDI into
manufacturing sector narrows income inequality. When the share of FDI that service sectors
receive increases by 1 percent, the Gini index grows by 0.01 point. In contrast, a 1-percent increase
in the share of FDI into manufacturing sector reduces the Gini index by 0.01 point. These findings
are basically in line with previous studies on the distributional effects of FDI (Noorbakhsh et al.,
2001; Sylwester, 2005). Although these results have not reached statistically significance, they
provide us with hints about how FDI shapes income distribution via economic sectors. It may be
possible that the insignificance results from a shorter time length. As the Chinese government
continues to record and publish information on FDI, future studies could contribute more evidence.

Summary
This chapter examines the evolvement of FDI policies in China and how these policies have
affected income distribution by influencing regional distribution and sectoral distribution of FDI
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inflows. Over the period 1980 – 2015, income inequality in China has deteriorated noticeably. This
trend coincides with greater openness of FDI. With China becoming more open to foreign investors,
foreign capital began to spread out across the nation in the 1990s. As a result, regional differences
in the amount of FDI inflows become smaller, indicating wider penetration of FDI in China. In
addition, service sectors have become increasingly popular among the international investment
community.
Scholars have long argued that a more equal regional distribution of FDI inflows may lead to
similarly high levels of economic development, often measured by per capita GDP, across
provinces. This dissertation provides a different picture of the distributional effect of wider
penetration of FDI. Liberalized policies make China more open to foreign investors, who begin to
invest their financial resources across the nation. As FDI becomes more significant in every corner
of the nation, their inequality-inducing effect intensifies. Building on the findings of enterprisebased wage premiums and skill-based wage premiums summarized in Chapter Two, I propose that
a wider regional distribution of FDI inflows reinforces wage differentials across enterprises and
across skill-levels, leading to rising income inequality. Empirical evidence from time-series
analysis shows that a more equal regional distribution of FDI inflows exacerbates, rather than
mitigates, income gaps between the haves and the have-nots. As the Chinese national and local
governments are still enthusiastic about attracting more foreign capital into their jurisdictions, it is
likely that income disparities will continue to worsen with an increasingly equal regional allocation
of FDI inflows.
Sectoral distribution of FDI inflows also seems to be relevant. Income inequality worsens
when service sectors receive more foreign capital, but income distribution becomes more equal
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when manufacturing industries are more popular among foreign investors. One issue concerning
these findings is that temporal coverage of the data is short, which may be a reason for the
insignificant coefficients. As data length becomes longer in the future, future studies may provide
more solid evidence.
In conclusion, the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows is channeled through regional and
sectoral distribution. These processes are not only affected by economic factors such as market
size and labor cost (Ali & Guo, 2005; Boermans et al., 2011; Dees, 1998; Sun et al., 2002), but
also shaped by government FDI policies. FDI policies designed by the Chinese government first
influence how FDI inflows are distributed across geographies and sectors, and then alter income
distribution.
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Chapter Five

Korea: Sectoral Openness and Income Inequality

Between the 1980s and the 2010s, income inequality in Korea has undergone drastic changes.
Earlier studies on Korea have praised its ability of both achieving rapid economic growth and
maintaining a relatively egalitarian income distribution in the 1970s and the 1980s. “Growth with
Equity” was given to glorify this balanced development (Feng, 2011; Rao, 1978). However, a
reversal occurred in 1993. A sharp upward trend of income inequality has been present since then
until slight declines in the early 2010s.
As Figure 5.1 shows, income inequality, measured by the market Gini index from the SWIID,
displays a U-shape pattern in Korea between 1980 and 2015. There are two distinct periods over
the past four decades: noticeable declines between 1980 and 1993, and sharp increases since 1993
with slight decreases in the early 2010s. Significant improvements in reducing income disparities
began to appear in the later 1970s. For about 15 years between 1978 and 1993, income inequality
had remarkably declined. In 1993, the Gini index reached the lowest value of 29.1 on a scale of 0
– 100. It is suggested that nearly full employment, rising wages, and government endorsement to
education contributed to this downward trend (An & Bosworth, 2013; Feng, 2011). However, this
trend reversed in 1993. A sharp take-off of income gaps features the second period. Scholars and
commentators have long blamed the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the following neoliberal
reforms as the culprit of rising income inequality in Korea. The data I used, however, indicate a
different story. Income inequality had already begun to deteriorate before the financial crisis
reached Korea. Neoliberal measures, including liberalized FDI policies described in detail in the
next section, were prioritized after the newly elected president Kim Young-Sam began its
administration in 1993. It is undeniable that the financial crisis and the following neoliberal
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policies have escalated the already worsening income inequality. But a comprehensive
examination of the trend of income inequality in Korea reveals that income distribution had
undergone dramatic changes before 1997. This observation aligns with some recent studies (An &
Bosworth, 2013; Mah, 2012).
Korea has long attracted scholarly attention to its income distribution (e.g. Adelman &
Robinson, 1978; An & Bosworth, 2013; Chi & Kwon, 2012; Fields & Yoo, 2000; Koo, 1984; Rao,
1978). Even its reputation of growth with equity has heavily challenged by rapid increases in
income inequality since the 1990s, Korea is still seen as a valuable case for other latecomers. The
distributional effect of FDI inflows in Korea has been investigated in more recent studies by
economists (Mah, 2002, 2006, 2012; Park & Mah, 2011). By using time-series analyses, these
studies concluded that increasing flows of foreign investment into Korea were associated with
rising income inequality between 1980 and 2008.
Two mechanisms have been argued to link FDI inflows and income disparities. First, FDI
inflows to Korea increase the demand for skilled labor. The rising demand drives up the relative
wage of skilled labor, generating large gaps between skilled labor and unskilled labor (Mah, 2002).
Second, FDI inflows to service sectors, especially financial and banking sectors, reportedly lead
to deterioration in income inequality since the neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (Mah, 2006; Park
& Mah, 2011). Despite these theoretical arguments, empirical evidence has been sparse. For
example, Mah (2006) only described the changes in FDI policies and inflows without empirically
examining whether sectoral distribution of FDI contributes to rising income inequality. Even
among the existing few empirical studies, policy liberalization and sectoral distribution of FDI are
not explicitly examined. For instance, although Mah (2002, 2012) found that rising income
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inequality is attributed to increasing inflows of FDI during the two periods of 1975 – 1995 and
1982 – 2008 based on results from ECMs, his studies only used FDI annual inflows.
As the analyses presented in Chapter Three confirm the inequality-inducing effect of FDI
inflows, this chapter explicitly explores how sectoral distribution of FDI inflows matters for
income distribution. I argue that the relationship between sectoral distribution of FDI inflows and
income inequality is not purely economic. The Korean government has been involved in this
process, either passively or actively at different time points. Based on the finding that FDI inflows
amplify wage differentials within service sectors (Bogliaccini & Egan, 2017; Evans & Timberlake,
1980), I propose that FDI policy liberalization in Korea has been influential in altering sectoral
distribution of FDI inflows, which in turn contributes to rising income inequality. A historical
review of FDI policies and time-series analysis support my arguments.
My analyses of the linkage between FDI policy liberalization, sectoral distribution of FDI
inflows, and income inequality are presented into two sections. In the first section, I first provide
an overview of how FDI policies have evolved over the past few decades. As FDI policies became
more liberal, more FDI has entered the Korean economy. However, not all economic sectors are
equally attractive to foreign investors. Service sectors have been preferred over manufacturing
sector since the early 1990s. In the second section, by modelling time-series data, I empirically
test the relationship between sectoral distribution of FDI inflows and income inequality. I find that
FDI inflows to services significantly contribute to wider income gaps. When combining the
findings from the historical review of FDI policies and time-series analysis, the linkage between
policy liberalization, FDI inflows to services, and income inequality becomes clear. By opening
more service sectors to foreign investors, policy liberalization amplifies the inequality-inducing
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effect of FDI inflows via wage differentials within service sectors, ultimately leading to fastgrowing income inequality in Korea.

Figure 5.1

Income Inequality in Korea

Data source: SWIID Version 8.3

FDI Policies in Korea
Over the past four decades, FDI into Korea has increased remarkably, particularly since the
early 1990s. According to the UNCTAD1, only about 0.05 billion foreign capital, as 7.25 percent
of Korea’s GDP, was invested in Korea in 1980. Yearly inflows of FDI grew slowly during the
1980s. Beginning in the early 1990s, foreign investors began to pour a much larger amount of
capital into Korea each year. The largest amount of yearly FDI inflows was 13.64 billion in 2005,
which was 1.52 times the GDP of that year. Although annual FDI inflows have not increased

1

Data can be accessed at https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740.
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monotonically, but rather with declines in some years, over the past few decades, it is relatively
clear that foreign capital has become much more significant in the Korean economy.
Reflected in rising annual inflows of FDI, FDI policies in Korea have undergone tremendous
changes. Between 1960 and 1980, foreign investment was welcomed but largely restricted in
certain areas to promote exports, improve technology, and protect domestic industries. Since 1980,
liberalization or market-oriented reforms of FDI policies gradually got momentum due to
ideological shifts of top political leaders and pressure from the international investment
community. But liberalization had only achieved moderate success over the period 1980 – 1993
(Bark & Moon, 2006; Bishop, 1997; Thurbon & Weiss, 2006). Active promotion of FDI became
a policy priority when Kim Young-Sam assumed the presidency in 1993. After the 1997 Financial
Crisis, a more thorough structural transformation of FDI policies emerged. In the following years,
the Korean government enacted a series of liberalization reforms in response to the financial crisis,
pressure from foreign investors, and the requirements attached to financial aids from the IMF. In
this section, I review the history of FDI policies in Korea between the 1960s and the 2010s.
Although this dissertation on income inequality in Korea only covers the period from the 1980s to
the 2010s, it is useful to check the initial FDI policies and compare them with later liberal reforms.
It shows how FDI policies have changed from restriction to liberalization gradually since 1993
and rapidly from 1998. Four aspects, including sectoral opening, foreign ownership, approval
process, and tax benefits, are used to evaluate whether and to what extent these policies are
restrictive or liberal.
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1) Restrictive Policies from 1960 to 1980
Between 1960 and 1980, restrictive policies were put in place to manage inflows of foreign
investment to meet the government’s development plan. To transform the industrial structure and
promote its capacity, the Korean government intentionally enacted a series of policies to gear
foreign investment toward export-oriented manufacturing sectors to obtain foreign exchange and
access to foreign markets. Foreign investment was also allowed in import-substitution sectors like
oil refineries, petrochemicals, and general chemical to acquire advanced technologies from
multinational corporates. However, foreigners were restricted or prohibited in service industries
such as banking, hotels, insurance services, and real estate (Chung, 2007).
Korea’s first foreign investment inducement policy, the Foreign Capital Inducement and
Promotion Act (FCIPA), was enacted in 1960. This policy was designed to attract foreign
investment inflows to develop industrial, agricultural, or fishery resources. However, restrictive
measures, such as only up to 20 percent of the original amount of investment could be repatriated,
were also imposed. In 1966, the Foreign Capital Inducement Law came into effect with some
relaxed measures. For example, full foreign ownership was allowed. In 1970, the Economic
Planning Board, which was in charge of foreign investment, used its extensive powers to facilitate
the investment approval process. After 1970, Free Trade zones (FTZs) were created to attract
foreign investment in labor-intensive and export-oriented industries such as textile, electronics,
and machinery (Bishop, 1997; Warr, 1984).
FDI policies became more restrictive in 1973. At that time, Korean president Park Chung-Hee
announced a new development plan with a focus on heavy and chemical industrialization. Building
on the industrial foundation of oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and general chemical plants,
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Park planned to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of steel and metals and then further
promote industries such as shipbuilding, industrial machinery, and automobiles. Consequentially,
more restrictive measures were issued. Foreign investment was not allowed to compete with
Korean companies either in obtaining resources or in the access to foreign markets. Foreign
investment was welcomed only when it generated foreign exchanges from exports and brought
technologies, or when it did not generate competition against Korean firms. Foreigners were not
allowed to hold more than 50 percent of equity in heavy chemical industry (Turner & Kim, 2017).
Majority foreign ownership only existed in extreme circumstances, while joint ventures were
overwhelmingly preferred to favor Korean domestic partners with advanced technologies. Lastly,
to prevent small firms, especially those from Japan, from flooding into the Korean economy, a
minimum investment amount was issued.

2) Limited Liberalization of FDI between 1980 and 1993
From 1980 to 1993, policy restrictions on foreign investment had been relaxed. However,
these policy revisions, which I provide more details below, only generated incremental changes
toward liberalization (Bishop, 1997). Although top political leaders showed interested in policy
liberalization, the investment environment was still not as friendly as they expected. The
unwillingness of bureaucrats to comply with the policy relaxations has been viewed as one reason
(Luedde‐Neurath, 1984).
During Chun Doo-Hwan’s administration (1980 – 1988), the jurisdiction of foreign
investment was transferred from the Economic Planning Board to the Ministry of Finance
(hereafter MOF). This transfer indicated that FDI was viewed as simply as one type of capital that
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could be used for development goals, instead of being intentionally managed by the Korean
government to achieve its priorities (Bishop, 1997). Several liberalization measures came into
effect with the revised Foreign Capital Inducement Law passed in 1984. First, a negative list
system replaced the previous positive list system, which was a major feature of the reform during
this period. Under the negative list system, FDI was allowed in any industry if that industry was
not listed with restrictions. Before this change, foreign investment was only allowed in industries
explicitly listed on the system. As a result, most industries from manufacturing and service sectors,
except for restricted areas, were declared to be open to foreign investors. Joint ventures were still
more preferred in many industries. Second, automatic approval was permitted in the following
four scenarios: when foreign ownership was less than 50 percent, when investment amount was
less than one million USD, when there was no claim for tax reduction, and when investment did
not enter a restricted area (Bishop, 1997). Third, tax benefits were only available when foreign
investment made a significant contribution to the balance of payments, technology advancement,
or when it went to a free export zone.
Progress toward liberalized FDI policies continued to be limited during Roh Tae-Woo’s
administration between 1988 and 1993. Improvement appeared in the following four areas, as
Bishop (2001) summarized from documents from MOF. First, 26 manufacturing sectors were
opened to FDI, which raising the openness ratio from 95 percent to 97 percent. This, however, was
not of much interest to foreign investors due to rising labor wages and declining profits in
manufacturing industries. Second, services sectors were still not fully open even though foreign
investors have long shown strong interests. Some service industries, like insurance, advertising,
and maritime services were partly opened. Third, with expansion in 1988 and 1991, automatic
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approval system, first introduced in 1984, was only permitted in certain circumstances, including
minority foreign equity and no tax incentives. Fourth, tax incentives became only available when
investment brought in advanced technologies.

3) Active Promotion of FDI since 1993
The 1997 Financial Crisis has been long marked as the start of radical liberalization of FDI in
Korea. However, studies on the history of government policies have revealed that the marketoriented movement already gained its momentum before 1997, more specifically in 1993. From
the beginning of Kim Young-Sam’s presidency (1993 – 1998), a more market-oriented approach
was imaged among top leaders. Due to internal pressure, like balancing payment, upgrading
technologies, and reforming the industrial structure, and external pressure from the WTO, the
OECD, and the IMF, radical liberalization reforms were carried out since 1998. These changes
finally lead to an unprecedented level of liberalized FDI policies in Korea, leaving only three
sectors completely closed to foreign investors: radio, television broadcasting, and nuclear power
(Nicolas et al., 2013).
Starting in 1993, as planned in a timetable, many previous restricted sectors became gradually
open to foreign investors during Kim Young-Sam’s tenure. For example, construction, road
transport services, entertainment, and personal services became available in 1994, while
agricultural production, foreign trade, ocean freight, and air freight were open in 1997 (MOF
reports from Bishop, 1997). In 1995, revisions were issued to open previously restricted areas.
Foreign investors were also allowed to merge or acquire existing Korean corporates. If these
revisions were fully implemented, the level of openness to FDI in Korea would become similar to
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those of other OECD countries (Bishop, 1997). In addition, service industries were further opened
to foreign investors (Kim & Kim, 2003). A total number of 129 service industries was liberalized
from 1993 to 1997 (Nicolas et al., 2013). Investment notification system, first introduced in 1991,
was further streamlined to simplify the procedures. Special assistance was also provided to foreign
investors in dealing with regulatory requirements.
After being dragged into an economic recession due to the Financial Crisis of 1997, Korea
became more enthusiastic about attracting FDI because it was perceived to provide a stable way
of financial development and lowered the risk of currency crashes. In his address to a joint meeting
of the US Congress on June 10th, 1998, Korean President Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003) explicitly
stated that foreign investment and market reforms were the only solutions to the crisis. As a result,
proactive promotion of FDI became a new policy orientation since 1998. To attract FDI, eight Free
Economic Zones (FEZs) have been created since 2003. Deregulated measures and tax incentives
are provided in these FEZs to create a favorable environment for foreign investors (Kim & Han,
2014).
Significant structural adjustments were conducted under the Foreign Investment Promotion
Act (FIPA) passed in 1998. The Act, with support from the IMF, made noticeable changes in
sectoral opening, foreign shareholding, and approval procedures. First, in 1998 dozens of business
sectors were open, at least partially, to foreign investors. These include formerly restricted areas
like rental and sale of real estate, insurance-related business, land development, power generation,
and waterworks. The openness of these areas led to only 1 percent of business sectors (a total of
1148) closed to FDI and another 1 percent with partial openness (Nicolas et al., 2013). Restrictions
on FDI were only present in sectors involving national security, public order, public health,
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environmental preservation, and social morals (Nicolas et al., 2013). Second, restrictions on
foreign shareholdings were eliminated or significantly reduced. Limits on foreign equity in
industries were also removed. Mergers, acquisitions, and even hostile takeovers were permitted.
Third, administrative procedures were greatly simplified. Under the FIPA, government approval
of FDI was no longer required unless investment went to defense-related companies. For most
investment, only prior notification by foreign investors was needed.

4) FDI Policies and Inflows
As presented above, Korean FDI policies have undertaken tremendous liberalization measures
since 1993, particularly after the Financial Crisis of 1997. Two main features of policy
liberalization have emerged. First, Korea has become increasingly open and friendly to foreign
investors. Former policy restrictions against foreign capital have been removed in the 1990s,
generating rapid increases in foreign capital into Korea. Second, service sectors have become much
more attractive to the international investment community than manufacturing since the early
1990s. Finance is currently one of the most attractive industries. To better illustrate policies
changes and their effects on FDI inflows, I present evidence from the KOF globalization index
dataset and official statistics from Korean Statistical Information Services (KOSIS). Table 5.1
presents the trends of policy liberalization and sectoral distribution of FDI in Korea between 19702
and 2015. The decade of the 1960s is not covered here due to a lack of reliable data. I close this
subsection with some discussion on geographic distribution of FDI in Korea. At this moment, it is
not possible for me to test how regional distribution of FDI influences income inequality because

2

The KOF globalization index is only available for countries since 1970.
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of unavailable data. But a recent study on how FIEs have been located in Korea, which I discuss
in more detail later, may offer inspirations for future studies.
FDI policy liberalization is indicated by the de jure financial globalization index3, the same
index I used in the previous Chapters. This index ranges from 0 to 100, which higher numbers
meaning greater openness to the world or more liberal policies. As shown in the first column of
Table 5.1, a clear pattern of liberalization has been present in Korea. As I discussed above, from
1960 to 1980, FDI policies were restrictive due to Korean leaders’ concerns about foreign control
and preferences for foreign loans and aids. Although the de jure index is not available for the
1960s, it shows an average score of 25.39 for the 1970s, which was much lower than the levels of
Japan (47.20) and Singapore (58.32), according to the KOF. It was actually the second lowest
score among the cases I examined, only high than the level of China (8.62). Beginning in the
1980s, the de jure index began to increase due to gradual openness during the presidencies of Chun
Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo. The average score of the 1980s was about 10 points higher than
that of the previous decade.
In 1993, FDI policy liberalization got stronger momentum from the administration of Kim
Young-Sam. This is reflected in a further increase in the FDI policy index, which finally reached
a value of 43.61 on the eve of rapid liberalization after the financial crisis. It may be argued that
the period from 1993 to 1997 is not that liberal compared to the previous period from the 1980s to
the early 1990s. If we only examine the de jure index, this argument may be valid. But when we
consider it with sectoral distribution of FDI, which is shown in Table 5.1 as well, it is clear that

A similar concern of whether this index is appropriate to indicate FDI policy liberalization rises in the Korean context
as well. A correlation test shows a Pearson’s R statistic with a value of 0.80 between the lagged values of this de jure
financial globalization index and yearly inflows of FDI into Korea from 1970 to 2015. This strong correlation warrants
the use of the index as an indicator of changes in FDI policies.
3
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year 1993 signals the beginning of an era featured by significant liberalization of FDI. From 1993
to 1997, the average annual inflows of FDI reached 2.1 billion USD from 0.68 billion during the
previous period 1980 – 1992. And the average yearly inflows of FDI into services first surpassed
those into manufacturing sectors. This new pattern of sectoral allocation becomes more
pronounced in the following years.
Starting from 1998, liberal orientation has become more manifested in Korean FDI policies.
In the following decade after the crisis, the de jure index averaged on 61.21, which is about 18
points increase from the previous period 1993 – 1997. And this liberal trend has continued to grow
in the 2010s, which raises the average score to 66.95. Along with liberalized FDI policies, FDI
yearly inflows have grown significantly. Between 1998 and 2009, the average annual inflows
further increased five-fold to around 10 billion each year from 2.1 billion during the period of 1993
to 1997. Slightly larger amounts of FDI inflows, namely 10.62 billion, were recorded for the first
five years of the 2010s.

Table 5.1
Period
1970 – 1979
1980 – 1992
1993 – 1997
1998 – 2009
2010 – 2015

FDI Policy Index and Sectoral Distribution of FDI in Korea
FDI Policy
Index (0-100)
25.39
35.02
43.61
61.21
66.95

FDI yearly inflows
(Mean, USD in billion)
0.1
0.68
2.1
9.36
10.62

Manufacturing
(% of total)
76.95
64.58
47.53
32.54
35.00

Services
(% of total)
21.68
31.04
51.89
59.94
61.58

Data source: KOF, UNCTAD, Bishop (1997), and KOSIS

The second characteristic that features FDI into Korea is that service sectors have been
preferred over manufacturing sectors by foreign investors since the early 1990s. And this sectoral
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shift is also shaped by Korean FDI policies. Between 1970 and 1992, FDI policies were much
more restrictive for service sectors than manufacturing sector, as discussed above. Foreign capital
was geared to improve Korea’s industrial capacity, introduce advance technologies, and ultimately
achieve the state’s development goals. Thus, as Table 5.1 shows, manufacturing sector had
received the largest shares of FDI inflows from 1970 to 1992. Services, at most, only accounted
for one-third of foreign investment. The situation changed in 1993. With liberalized policies,
service sectors surpassed manufacturing to receive most FDI. From 1993 to 1997, service sectors
had absorbed 51.89 percent of FDI each year. The gap in attractiveness between services and
manufacturing becomes even larger in the following years, particularly in the 2010s.
Correlation tests give us a hint about how policy liberalization shapes inflows and sectoral
distribution of FDI. As I described above, liberal policy reforms not only removed previous
restrictions on foreign ownership, but also opened more economic sectors to foreign investors,
particularly service sectors. Therefore, I anticipate not only a positive relationship between policy
liberalization and rising volumes of yearly FDI inflows, but also a positive relationship between
policy liberalization and increasing FDI flows into services. Correlation tests offer support for
these anticipations. Because there are significant lags in policy effects, I use one-year lagged values
of the de jure index. As Table 5.2 shows, the de jure index is strongly associated with yearly
inflows of FDI between 1980 and 2015. As FDI policies become more liberal, annual inflows
increase significantly. Policy Liberalization also alters how FDI is allocated in the Korean
economy. There is a negative relationship between the de jure index and the percentages of FDI
into manufacturing. But this negative association should not be interpreted as FDI policies prohibit
the entry of foreign investors into manufacturing sectors. Instead, it reflects losing popularity of
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manufacturing due to the openness of services sectors. According to Table 5.2, the shares of FDI
into services increase with policy liberalization. As FDI policies become increasingly open,
foreign investors shift their priorities from manufacturing to services.

Table 5.2

Correlation between FDI Policies and FDI Inflows in Korea

Lagged FDI
policy liberalization

FDI inflows

FDI inflows to
manufacturing

FDI inflows
to services

0.75

-0.59

0.69

Data source: KOF, UNCTAD, KOSIS

With respect to geographic distribution of FDI in Korea, previous discussion is extremely
limited, at least in the English world. By using ArcGIS techniques, Kim and Han (2014) visualized
how FDI inflows have been dispersed in Korea from the 1970s to the 2000s. Using the numbers
of FIEs as a proxy of FDI inflows, they found a U-shape pattern of how FIEs are located. In the
1970s, the vast majority of FIEs were located in the capital city of Seoul and the second-tier city
Busan, resulting in an unequal distribution of FDI. This unequal dispersion slightly improved
between the 1980s and the 1990s as other major cities like Daegu and Ulsan also became homes
to FIEs. However, since the 2000s, the concentration of FIEs reoccurred. The capital region is the
most preferable place for foreign investors to establish their businesses, of which most fall in
service sectors. It is reported that 55 percent of FIEs are located in Seoul, and 83.7 percent are in
the broader capital region in 2010 (Kim & Han, 2014).
Is the uneven regional dispersion of FDI shaped by FDI policies? I suspect a negative answer.
First, FDI policies do not reveal a clear trend of whether and how local governments have
promoted FDI over the past four decades. Even though FEZs were established to attract FDI by
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offering favorable treatments, FDI was seemingly not restricted or prohibited in most localities in
Korea even in the early years of the 1970s and the 1980s. Second, Kim and Han (2014) proposed
four factors that jointly contribute to the extreme popularity of Seoul among the foreign investment
community: benefits of being proximate to other businesses; the concentration of high-quality
education provision, the long history of being home to FIEs with low risks, and the advantages of
being a knowledge-based economic structure. FDI policies are not considered as one factor that
alters the allocation of FIEs and FDI inflows. Therefore, I suspect that geographic allocation does
not serve as a channel through which FDI policies shape income distribution. An empirical
examination would provide more solid grounds for this postulation, but the information of FIEs
covering a long time-span is not publicly accessible at this point. This issue may be considered in
future studies.

FDI and Income Inequality: Sectoral Openness
The second part of my arguments is to demonstrate the inequality-inducing effect of FDI
inflows when it enters service sectors. Although a few studies on Korea suggest that FDI inflows
to service sectors, especially financial and banking sectors, deteriorates income inequality since
the neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (Mah, 2006; Park & Mah, 2011), empirical evidence is still
sparse. For example, Mah (2006) only described the changes in FDI policies and inflows without
empirically examining whether sectoral distribution of FDI inflows contributes to rising income
inequality. My time-series analyses explicitly examine this issue.
To estimate how sectoral distribution of FDI inflows affects market inequality in Korea
between 1980 and 2015, I employ error correction models (ECMs), which are the same estimator
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I used in the previous chapters. The first difference of market Gini is regressed on the lagged term
of market inequality, sectoral distribution of FDI inflows, unemployment rate, and logged GDP
per capita. Two variables indicate how FDI inflows are allocated across industries: the proportions
of FDI inflows to manufacturing and service sectors. The level and lagged terms are used to
indicate the short- and long-term effects of these variables. Unit root tests and cointegration tests
are conducted before running ECMs. Detailed test results are presented in Appendix 4. A quick
overview of these tests is that the Gini index, the percentages of FDI inflows to manufacturing and
services, unemployment rate, and logged GDP per capita are all unit root or integrated at the first
order. Cointegration tests show that a long-term equilibrium relationship exists between the Gini
index and independent variables.
The results of ECMs are reported in Table 5.3. Both two models have a significant coefficient
for the lagged Gini index, indicating serial correlation has been corrected. Sectoral distribution of
FDI inflows, particularly more inflows to service, is found to be associated with widening income
gaps. Model 1 reports how FDI into services influences income distribution in both the short and
long terms. As for Model 1, as the shares of FDI inflows to services increase, income inequality
climbs up. In the short term, a 1-percent increase in FDI into services results in a 0.01-point
increase in income inequality. In the long term, when the shares of FDI into services increase by
1 percent, the Gini index grows by is 0.09 point4. In contrast to the inequality-rising effect of FDI
inflows to services, FDI into manufacturing sectors seems to reduce income gaps. But its
inequality-reduction effect is not found significant in the short and long terms, as Model 2 shows.
Combining all the results, I found that sectoral distribution of FDI inflows deteriorates income

This number is obtained by dividing the coefficient for the lagged FDI into services (0.01) by the absolute value of the
coefficient for the lagged market Gini (-0.11).
4
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distribution in Korea. Given the popularity of service sectors, this finding is particularly
concerning.

Table 5.3

Sectoral Distribution of FDI Inflows and Income Inequality in Korea
Variables
Market Ginit-1

Model 1
-0.11***
(0.03)
0.01**
(0.00)
0.01***
(0.00)

Δ FDI into services
FDI into servicest-1
Δ FDI into Manufacturing
FDI into Manufacturing t-1
Δ Unemployment rate

0.17**
(0.08)
0.15***
(0.04)
-0.27
(2.25)
0.11
(0.13)
1.27
(1.44)
35
0.64

Unemployment rate t-1
Δ Logged GDP p.c.
Logged GDP p.c. t-1
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Model 2
-0.10**
(0.04)

-0.004
(0.003)
-0.006
(0.004)
0.16*
(0.08)
0.11**
(0.05)
-0.26
(2.50)
0.26**
(0.13)
0.62
(1.69)
35
0.55

Error correction models. Two-tailed significance levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Summary
This chapter examines the evolvement of income inequality and FDI policies in Korea and
provides time-series evidence showing how FDI policies have shaped income distribution through
sectoral distribution of FDI inflows. Over the period 1980 – 2015, income inequality in Korea has
experienced a U-shape pattern. The Gini index significantly decreased in the 1980s but began to
rise dramatically since the early 1990s. This trend parallels with liberalization of FDI policies.
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After being highly restrictive before the 1980s, FDI policies achieved modest openness during the
1980s. Significant liberalization occurred since 1993, particularly after the Financial Crisis of
1997.
With FDI policies becoming more liberalized, previous restrictions against foreign investors
on service sectors have been reduced and later largely removed. These liberal changes create
opportunities for FDI to enter service sectors. That is why we have observed that foreign investors
shifted their focus from manufacturing industries to service sectors. This sectoral shift toward
services has distributional implications. Because FDI inflows have been found to be a contributor
to income differentials within service sectors, liberalized FDI policies and hence more FDI flows
into services intensify incomes gaps. In this case, FDI policy liberalization contributes to rising
income inequality by enhancing the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows, particularly when
foreign investors are allowed to enter service sectors.
My historical and statistical analyses provide evidence linking policy liberalization, sectoral
distribution of FDI inflows, and income inequality together. I demonstrate that the Korean
government is by no means absent in the distributional effect of FDI inflows. Liberalization
measures in FDI policies intensify the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows by opening service
sectors. Even though liberalized FDI polices were originally designed to ease former restrictions
on FDI inflows and attract more foreign capital to boost the Korean economy (Nicolas et al., 2013),
their influence on distributional outcomes should not be overlooked.
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Chapter Six

Conclusion and Discussion

Since the 1980s, an increasing portion of global FDI has flown into East Asia developing
countries. Even though foreign investment dropped significantly in the first few years following
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, East Asia has regained the trust of foreign investors and later has
become the darling of the international investment community. According to data from the
UNCTAD1, FDI inflows to East Asia between 2010 and 2015 has almost accounted for a quarter2
of the total amount of global FDI inflows. At the meantime, escalation in income inequality has
been documented in this region. This dissertation aims to identify whether there is a relationship
between FDI inflows and income inequality in East Asia.
There has been a considerable body of literature explaining the distributional effect of FDI
inflows. Although early studies expect FDI inflows to be an income equalizer, most recent studies
have found the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows. My analyses contribute to this growing
literature by providing new time-series evidence from East Asia. However, this dissertation is not
just an empirical reexamination of the distributional effect of FDI inflows. Inspired by studies on
policy liberalization and economic freedom, this dissertation also explores whether and how FDI
policies are involved in the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows. By bridging the two groups
of literature on FDI inflows and FDI policies, my analyses offer a more comprehensive
understanding of the role of government in the distributional effect of FDI inflows.
To answer my research questions, I employ the nested analysis approach proposed by
(Lieberman, 2005). By using TSCS analysis as the first step, I examine the relationship between

1
2

FDI data can be obtained at https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740.
The specific number is 23.36 percent based on author’s calculation.
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FDI inflows and income inequality and the influence of FDI policies in this relationship. Statistical
results indicate that FDI inflows have become an influential driving force of rising income
inequality since the 1980s in East Asia. The inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows is present
both in the short and long terms. Statistical analyses also show that the adverse effect of FDI
inflows is not immune to political forces. More specifically, I find that liberalization of FDI
policies amplifies the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows.
How does FDI policy liberalization intensify the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows?
To answer this question, I select China and Korea for case study as the second step of nested
analysis. Building on existing literature on enterprise-based wage premiums, skill-based wage
premiums, and wage polarization within service sectors, I argue that the inequality-inducing effect
of FDI inflows is intensified by policy liberalization through two channels: regional distribution
and sectoral distribution.
Both case studies provide historical and time-series evidence supporting my arguments. On
the one hand, China’s policy openness to foreign investors has led to broader penetration of FDI
inflows across its provinces. Scholars have long advocated for an equal regional distribution of
FDI inflows in China to reduce differences in economic growth between provinces. In contrast, I
argue that an equal regional distribution of FDI inflows is detrimental to income inequality, even
if it may generate economic growth. As FDI inflows become widely dispersed across provinces in
China, their influence on enterprise-based and skill-based wage premiums become more
pronounced in local economies, contributing to growing income gaps. Case study on China
supports this argument. On the other hand, as for the Korean case, sectoral distribution of FDI is
more influential. As policy restrictions began to be eased in the early 1990s, service sectors finally
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became more accessible to foreign investors. As a result, service sectors have received most FDI
inflows since the 1990s. Building on previous findings that FDI inflows exacerbate wage
differentials within service sectors, I demonstrate that the sectoral shift of FDI inflows toward
service sectors in Korea leads to growing income inequality.
In summary, the parallel trends of increasing FDI inflows and rising income inequality in East
Asia are by no means accidental or unrelated. New time-series evidence confirms the deleterious
effect of FDI inflows on income distribution. But the distributional effect of FDI inflows is not a
purely economic phenomenon because government policies, specifically FDI policies, have played
a significant role in it. Both statistical and historical evidence indicate that liberalized FDI policies
impose a conditional effect on how FDI inflows perpetuate income inequality. The conditional
effect of FDI policies is materialized in two ways: regional distribution and sectoral distribution.
An equal regional distribution of FDI inflows intensifies enterprise-based wage premiums and
skill-based wage premiums, while a sectoral shift of FDI inflows toward service sectors reinforces
wage polarization within service sectors. These two channels ultimately result in growing income
inequality. Therefore, the positive relationship between FDI inflows and income inequality in East
Asia is a joint product of political and economic forces. The role of FDI policies is essential to the
understanding of how FDI inflows affect income inequality.

Empirical and Theoretical Contributions
The findings presented above make three empirical and theoretical contributions to the
research on the distributional effect of FDI inflows and FDI policy liberalization. First, this
dissertation provides new time-series evidence to enrich the research on East Asia. Income
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inequality has received considerable attention from scholars and policy makers in this region.
However, much work has been done in individual countries, fewer studies are examining the
region as a whole (Chi & Kwon, 2012; Feng, 2011). Even among these studies examining the
region of East Asia, they fall short of providing comprehensive empirical evidence on the
relationship between FDI inflows and income inequality. For example, Chi and Kwon (2012)
provided a broader review of existing theories on income inequality, including FDI inflows, but
they only tested the correlation between income inequality and each explanatory variable
separately. This dissertation contributes to the scholarship on East Asia by providing a
comprehensive empirical examination covering nine countries or political entities, including
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
Not only does this dissertation covers a broader range of countries than previous studies, but also
it provides longer temporal evidence showing the distributional evidence of FDI inflows over the
past four decades. Additionally, this dissertation also provides a more systematic examination of
income inequality by testing potential explanations against each other. Statistical results indicate
that FDI inflows increase income inequality in East Asia both in the short and long terms. The
inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows is significant and consistent when alternative
explanations from political, economic, and sociodemographic perspective are controlled and
potentially influential countries are excluded.
Second, this dissertation stresses the influence of government in the relationship between FDI
inflows and income distribution via FDI policies. The role of government has mostly been missing
or implicitly examined in the literature on the distributional effect of FDI inflows in cross-national
studies. The same issues also exist in studies on East Asia (An & Bosworth, 2013; Fields, 1994;
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Fields & Yoo, 2000). In these studies, it is often implied that FDI policy liberalization is equal to
growing FDI inflows. I argue that they are not identical, even though they are related. The volumes
of inward FDI are a result of a range of factors, including government policies (Ang, 2008; Choong
& Lam, 2010; Sharma et al., 2012; Zhang, 2011). Thus, when FDI is found to be influential in
income distribution, it probably does not accurately reflect the role of government policies. Unlike
many previous studies, this dissertation explicitly examines the influence of government via FDI
policies. It is found that FDI policy liberalization exacerbates the inequality-inducing effect of FDI
inflows. As FDI policies become more liberalized, FDI inflows become more harmful to equal
income distribution. By distinguishing FDI policies from FDI inflows, this dissertation not only
directly investigate the impacts of government policies, but also emphasizes the need for
differentiating policy forces and economic forces. This approach, as suggested by the analyses
presented in this dissertation, may offer a better way of understanding the economic consequences
of globalization.
Third, this dissertation explores the mechanisms by which FDI policy liberalization shapes
income distribution. As I summarized in Chapter Two, there is a small but growing literature
identifying the relationship between economic freedom/neoliberalism and income inequality. The
findings of this literature imply that FDI policy liberalization is also detrimental to income
distribution as other types of policy liberalization. However, existing studies have not provided
explanations on why liberalized FDI policies is harmful, or in other words, how liberalized FDI
policies drive up income gaps. This dissertation answers these questions by conducting case study
on China and Korea. Analyses show that FDI policy liberalization intensifies the inequalityinducing effect of FDI via regional distribution and sectoral distribution. An equal regional
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distribution of FDI inflows reinforces enterprise-based and skill-based wage premiums, and more
FDI into service sectors amplifies wage polarization between occupations within service sectors.
Increasingly liberalized policies make two mechanisms become more pronounced in host
economies, leading to growing income inequality. As I explained in Chapter One, regional
distribution and sectoral distribution of FDI inflows are not unique issues for China and Korea.
Thus, the findings on these two mechanisms provide some insights for improving our
understanding of how FDI policy liberalization conditions the inequality-inducing effect of FDI
inflows.

Limitations
Two limitations deserve some discussion. First, it may raise concerns about my analyses of
FDI policies because the de jure financial globalization index I adopted from the KOF is broadly
defined to measure policies related to financial flows, not just policies related to FDI. The only
policy index I found that specifically measures FDI policies is the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness
Index from the OECD. However, as I discussed in Chapter Three, the OECD index only provides
limited coverage on East Asia, which will significantly reduce the sample size and constrain the
validity of statistical results if it is used in analyses. The larger data coverage is one major reason
why I choose to use the de jure financial globalization index, even if it measures a broader scope
of policies related to foreign investment.
To mitigate the concern that the results of the de jure financial globalization index may also
indicate the influence of other financial policies, rather than just FDI policies, I use the following
two ways. First, the conditional effect of FDI policies is indicated by the coefficient for the
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interaction term between the de jure financial globalization index and FDI inflows. When the
interaction is found to be statistically significant, policies that are involved should be mainly
related to FDI inflows. Thus, by using an interaction term, I try to single out FDI policies from
other financial policies measured in the de jure financial globalization index. At the same time,
the influence of other financial policies should be reflected in the coefficient for the de jure
financial globalization index, not the coefficient for the interaction term. Second, in case studies
on China and Korea, I primarily use the de jure financial globalization index to confirm the features
of policy changes I summarized from the historical reviews of FDI policies in both countries.
When there is a need for time-series analysis in these two case studies, I use indicators measuring
the actual regional distribution and sectoral distribution of FDI inflows instead of directly using
this de jure index. By doing so, I try to avoid introducing the influence of other financial policies
to the analyses of FDI policies.
Second, due to data constraints, my analyses on sectoral distribution of FDI inflows in China
and regional distribution of FDI inflows in Korea are limited. Although I still find a relationship
between FDI inflows to service sectors and rising income inequality in China, the evidence is weak
because of short time coverage. As for the Korean case, without the access to data indicating
regional distribution of FDI inflows, it is difficult to gauge its impacts on income distribution.
Although I suspect that regional distribution of FDI inflows has not been a major way affecting
income distribution based on my policy review and the results of a recent study by Kim and Han
(2014),

future studies with more available data may provide more solid grounds for this

postulation.
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Implications and Concluding Remarks
This dissertation starts with an observation of the parallel trends of increasing FDI inflows
and rising income inequality in East Asia. Building on previous studies, I propose a synthesized
theoretical framework that incorporates FDI inflows, FDI policies, three mechanisms by which
FDI inflows raise income inequality, and income distribution. Results of statistical analyses and
case studies not only confirm the inequality-inducing effect of FDI inflows, but also demonstrate
how FDI policy liberalization reinforces this effect. The theoretical framework and the analytical
findings of this dissertation offer important implications for further studies and policymaking.
Theoretically, the synthesized theoretical framework used in this dissertation suggests that an
integrated approach is beneficial for providing a comprehensive picture of the distributional
outcomes of FDI inflows and FDI policies, and more broadly globalization and neoliberalism. A
considerable size of research has achieved remarkable progress in identifying theoretical reasons
and providing empirical evidence for the distributional effects of globalization, but this research
has not thoroughly examined the role of policy liberalization. On the other hand, much work has
been done on the causes and process of neoliberalism in various contexts, including East Asia
(Beeson & Islam, 2005; Park et al., 2012; Pirie, 2007; Robison & Hewison, 2005; Woo, 2007) and
Latin America (Gwynne & Kay, 2000; Weyland, 1996, 2003, 2004).Studies on the distributional
consequences of policy liberalization or neoliberalism are relatively new.
Since the early twenty-first century when neoliberal policies have been implemented
worldwide, scholars began to assess the effects of neoliberalism. A bourgeoning literature has
concluded that neoliberal policies deteriorate, rather than mitigate, income inequality in various
contexts (Alfredo Filho & Johnston, 2005; Davis-Hamel, 2012; Huber & Solt, 2004; Johnston,
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2005; Stiglitz, 2002). Research on Latin America also suggests that policy liberalization related to
trade, finance, capital account opening, and tax reform is associated with increasing wage and
income gaps (Walton, 2004). However, the mechanisms between liberalized policies and income
distribution are not yet fully unfolded. This dissertation proposes a more comprehensive way of
examining how neoliberalism affects economic outcomes. Instead of arguing that policy
liberalization directly shapes income distribution, my synthesized theoretical framework suggests
that liberalized policies influence the distribution of FDI inflows across geographies and sectors,
which in turn affects income distribution. Supported by my case studies of China and Korea, these
theoretical predictions offer a novel approach for understanding globalization and neoliberalism.
Practically, the findings presented in this dissertation stress the importance of reconsidering
the implementation of liberalized policies, or more broadly neoliberalism. Since the 1980s,
neoliberalism, as a political-economy project, has gained popularity across the globe and later has
become a dominant policy paradigm manifested in the Washington consensus (Tickell & Peck,
2003; Venugopal, 2015). Advocates for this market-oriented project have long argued that
liberalization of government policies, including those related to FDI, trade, economic regulation,
property ownership, and fiscal austerity, removes inefficient government intervention that distort
the market. With distortionary restrictions lifted, policy liberalization aims to maximize the
potential of the market in promoting strong and stable economic growth. By holding the concept
of “trickle-down”, those proponents believe that economic growth will benefit everyone, leading
to reduction in poverty and income inequality (Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Johnston, 2005).
Yet, the reality is not as rosy as they expected. In line with the growing scholarship of the
distributional consequences of neoliberalism, this dissertation concludes that policy liberalization
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perpetuates, rather than alleviates, income inequality via regional distribution and sectoral
distribution of FDI inflows in East Asia. This is particularly concerning as East Asia has moved
toward neoliberalism over the past few decades, especially after the 1997 financial crisis, and FDI
has become more significant in their economies (Robison & Hewison, 2005; Woo, 2007). If
liberalization of FDI policies has been widely accepted and implemented, are there any
government policies that can potentially mitigate or even reverse the inequality-inducing effect of
liberalized policies? Particularly, government redistributive policies?
However, existing studies on government redistribution suggest that this approach may not
work due to the retrenchment of social welfare. In the literature on social welfare retrenchment,
there has been increasing evidence showing that neoliberalism contributes to the shrinking size of
government social programs and decreasing social protection since the 1980s in affluent
democracies (For example, Clayton & Pontusson, 1998; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Kwon &
Pontusson, 2010; Pierson, 2001). This trend of retrenchment has been observed in East Asia as
well, particularly after 1997. Although the scale of retrenchment in this region may not be as acute
as those in advanced democracies, significant cuts have occurred in government redistributive
programs such as unemployment insurance, employment protection, and housing (Chen & Li,
2012; Lee, 2007; Song, 2009; Woo, 2007). Thus, redistribution may not be effective in slowing
down rising income disparities. In this case, how to handle the adverse effects of neoliberalism
would become a challenging issue for countries with higher economic integration and weakening
redistributive policies.
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Appendix 1
Variables
Market Gini Index

Data Sources

Data Source
Standardized World Income Inequality Data, Version 8.3

https://fsolt.org/swiid/
Electoral competition index

V-Dem dataset, Version 9, https://www.v-

dem.net/en/data/data-version-9/
Government spending on
education

World Bank Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
Taiwan data from Taiwan National Statistics,
http://statdb.dgbas.gov.tw/pxweb/Dialog/statfile9L.asp#

China’s Education spending data 1999-2015 from Department of
Education
Foreign Direct Investment, annual United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
inflows as a percentage of GDP
(UNCTAD),

https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.as
px?ReportId=96740.
De jure financial globalization
index
De jure trade globalization index
Trade (including imports and
exports) as a percentage of GDP
GDP per capita, adjusted for
purchasing power parity at 2011
international dollars
The elderly population, age 65
and above, as a percentage of the
total population
Unemployment rate

The KOF Globalization Index

https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kofglobalisation-index.html
World Bank Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
IMF World Economic Outlook Database,

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/i
ndex.aspx
World Bank Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
Taiwan data from Taiwan National Statistics,
http://statdb.dgbas.gov.tw/pxweb/Dialog/statfile9L.asp#
World Bank Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
International Labor Organization, https://ilostat.ilo.org/

Korean data (1965-1990) from Korean labor Institute
Human capital index

Penn World Table version 9.1(pwt9.1),

https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/human_capital_in_pwt_90.pdf
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Appendix 2

Unit-Root and Cointegration Tests

First, to identify the existence of unit root, I test level form of each variable by using the
xtunitroot package of Stata with the fisher option and a two-lag autocorrelation structure. The test
is based on the Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity or unit root. Test results show that that most
variables, especially those of interest, are integrated or unit root. Thus, it is necessary and more
appropriate to use dynamic panel data estimator than static estimator such as fixed effects models.
Second, I run panel cointegration tests between market Gini and each independent variable by
using the xtcointtest command with the pedroni option. Three related statistics are reported in each
test. By considering all three statistics, I conclude that cointegration exists between market Gini
and independent variable.

Test results of Unit Root and Cointegration
Variables

Unit Root

Market Gini
FDI
De jure financial globalization index
Electoral competition index
Government education spending
Trade
De jure trade globalization index
Logged GDP per capita
Unemployment rate
Elderly population
Human capital index

Yes (0.44)
No (0.00)
Yes (0.30)
Yes (0.65)
No (0.00)
Yes (0.90)
Yes (0.99)
No (0.00)
Yes (0.12)
Yes (0.99)
Yes (0.72)

Cointegration with
Market Gini
--Yes
Yes
-Yes
Yes
-Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: p values in parentheses.
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Appendix 3 Tests for Unit Root and Cointegration for China Time Series Data
Variables
Market Gini
CV of FDI
FDI into manufacturing
FDI into services
Logged GDP per capita
Govt. education spending
Unemployment rate

Unit root
Yes, I (1)
Yes, I (1)
Yes, I (1)
Yes, I (1)
No
Yes, I (1)
Yes, I (1)
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Cointegration with market Gini
-Yes
No
No
-No
Yes

Appendix 4 Tests for Unit Root and Cointegration for Korea Time Series Data
Variables
Market Gini
FDI into manufacturing
FDI into services
Logged GDP per capita
Unemployment rate

Unit root
Yes, I (1)
Yes, I (1)
Yes, I (1)
Yes, I (1)
Yes, I (1)
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Cointegration with market Gini
-Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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